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Abstract
This Note examines recent attempts to resolve over sixty years of criticism of the Warsaw
Convention’s liability limits. Part I discusses the Warsaw Convention, the international commu-
nity’s efforts to expand the liability provisions of the Warsaw Convention, and judicial treatment
of the Warsaw Convention’s liability limits in the United States. Part II describes recent propos-
als to resolve the issue of liability limits, including the IATA Intercarrier Agreement, the DOT’s
proposed conditions to the IATA Intercarrier Agreement, the EC Proposal on air carrier liability,
and the ICAO’s draft of a new international convention. Part III argues that the IATA Intercarrier
Agreement does not eliminate the need to amend the Warsaw Convention’s liability provisions
because contractual agreements such as the IATA Intercarrier Agreement cannot achieve the dual
goals of uniform liability limits and systematic legal procedures foreseen by the Warsaw Con-
vention’s drafters. This Note concludes that global adoption of a new international convention is
the best means of regulating air carrier liability given the complexities of the worldwide aviation
industry today.
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INTRODUCTION
To protect the still-developing aviation industry,' the dele-
gates of twenty-three nations2 enacted the Convention for the
Unification of Certain Rules Relating to International Transpor-
tation by Air3 ("Warsaw Convention") in 1929.' Politicians, legal
* J.D. Candidate, 1998, Fordham University.
1. See 1 LEE S. KREINDLER, AVIATION ACCIDENT LAw § 10.01[2], at 10-3 (1996)
[hereinafter 1 KREINDLER] (discussing status of international aviation industry in 1929).
In 1929, Pan American Airlines, the only international air carrier in the United States,
limited its international flights to the route between Havana, Cuba and Key West, Flor-
ida. Id. Air France confined its flights to France, England, and North Africa. Id. Air
carriers did not transport passengers at night. Id. During the period between 1925-29,
domestic and international air carrier operations totaled 400 million passenger miles,
with a fatality rate of 45 deaths per 100 million passenger miles. See Andreas F.
Lowenfeld & Allan I. Mendelsohn, The United States and the Warsaw Convention, 80 HARV.
L. REV. 497, 498 (1967) (discussing international aviation during period between 1925-
29). Twenty years later, the fatality rate was 0.55 deaths per 100 million passenger
miles. Id. at 498 n.3. Larger aircraft carrying 15-20 passengers could travel at about 120
miles per hour over distances of approximately 550 miles. Id. at 498.
2. See 1 STUART M. SPEISER & CHARLES F. KRAUSE, AVIATION TORT LAW § 11:4, at 634
(1978 & Supp. 1996) [hereinafter 1 SPEISER & KRAUSE] (discussing enactment of War-
saw Convention). The Warsaw Convention is a set of liability rules aimed at governing
the risks involved in international air transportation. Id. at 637. The majority of the
original signatory countries to the Warsaw Convention were European, including Ger-
many, France, Great Britain, Italy, and Switzerland. Id. at 634. More than 110 countries
currendy adhere to the Warsaw Convention. U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, TREATIES IN FORCE
(1996).
3. Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules Relating to International
Transportation by Air, Oct. 12, 1929, 49 Stat. 3000, 137 L.N.T.S. 11 [hereinafter Warsaw
Convention]. The preamble to the Warsaw Convention indicates that its signatories
.recognized the advantage of regulating in a uniform manner the conditions of interna-
tional transportation by air in respect of the documents used for such transportation
and of the liability of the carrier. . . ." Id., pmbl., 49 Stat. at 3014, 137 L.N.T.S. at 15.
4. Id. The Warsaw Convention applies "to all international transportation of per-
sons, baggage, or goods performed by aircraft for hire." Id. art. 1(1), 49 Stat. at 3014,
137 L.N.T.S. at 15. Article 1(2) defines international transportation as:
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scholars, and lay commentators have widely criticized the War-
saw Convention as being outdated, 5 primarily because it limits
air carrier liability in air disasters to US$75,000 per passenger, 6
unless a passenger proves willful misconduct on the part of an
air carrier. 7 Trying to prove willful misconduct for death or bod-
ily injury in aviation accidents usually leads to long, costly litiga-
tion yielding compensation incommensurate with the amount
passengers seek."
On November 12, 1996, the U.S. Department of Transporta-
tion9 ("DOT") approved a new intercarrier agreement ' ° ("IATA
Intercarrier Agreement") to increase the liability limits of the
Warsaw Convention. 1 Under the IATA Intercarrier Agreement,
[A]ny transportation in which, according to the contract made by the parties,
the place of departure and the place of destination, whether or not there be a
break in the transportation or a transshipment, are situated either within the
territories of two High Contracting Parties, or within the territory of a single
High Contracting Party, if there is an agreed stopping place within a territory
subject to the sovereignty, suzerainty, mandate or authority of another power,
even though that power is not a party to this convention.
Id. In both the United Kingdom and the United States, a High Contracting Party is not
merely a signatory country, but rather a country that has ratified the Warsaw Conven-
tion. 1 SPEISER & KRAUSE, supra note 2, § 11:13, at 661-62.
5. See 1 SPEISER & KRAUSE, supra note 2, § 11:17, at 669-70 (noting dissatisfaction
with Warsaw Convention among Congressional representatives, lawyers, and lay com-
mentators).
6. See Christopher Carlsen, Recent Developments in Aviation Law, 32 TORT & INS. L.J.
231, 231 (1997) (discussing liability limits under Warsaw Convention). The Warsaw
Convention originally limited air carrier liability for passenger injury or death to ap-
proximately US$8,300 in 1929 dollars. Id. In 1966, dissatisfaction with this liability
limit led to the adoption of a private agreement between the United States and air
carriers serving the United States that raised the liability limit to US$75,000. Id. After
adjusting for inflation, this amount would currently exceed US$300,000. Id.
7. Warsaw Convention, supra note 3, arts. 25(1), 25(2), 49 Stat. at 3020, 137
L.N.T.S. at 27; see Susan Carey & Leslie Scism, Airlines: Old Liability Limits May Not Apply
in TWA Crash, WALL ST. J.,July 24, 1996, at BI (discussing liability limits under Warsaw
Convention).
8. See Carey & Scism, supra note 7, at B1 (explaining increased cost and delay
involved in litigation when plaintiffs attempt to prove that air carrier acted with willful
misconduct).
9. I.H. DIEDERIKS-VERSCHOOR, AN INTRODUCrION TO AIR LAw § 2, at 11 & n.6-A
(1988). In the United States, the Department of Transportation ("DOT") regulates the
conduct and safety of the aviation industry. Id.
10. INTERNATIONAL AIR TRANSPORT ASSOCIATION, INTERCARRIER AGREEMENT ON PAS-
SENGER LIABILr Y, open for signature Oct. 31, 1995 (on file with the Fordham International
LawJournal) [hereinafter IATA INTERCARRIER AGREEMENT].
11. DEP'T OF TRANSP., ORDER APPROVING INTERNATIONAL AIR TRANSPORT ASSOCIA-
TION: AGREEMENT RELATING TO LIABILITY LIMITATIONS OF THE WARSAW CONVENTION; AIR
TRANSPORT ASSOCIATION OF AMERICA: AGREEMENT RELATING TO LIABLITY LIMITATIONS
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domestic and international air carriers must waive the Warsaw
Convention's liability cap." Instead of the current liability limit,
strict liability"3 would apply to the amount of a claim that does
not exceed 100,000 Special Drawing Rights14 ("SDRs"), recently
valued at approximately US$146,000.1 5 Furthermore, unless an
air carrier proves it was not negligent, passengers could conceiv-
ably recover additional damage amounts. 16 Under the IATA In-
tercarrier Agreement, passengers no longer have to prove willful
misconduct on the part of an air carrier. t7
The IATA Intercarrier Agreement, jointly proposed by the
International Air Transport Association" ("IATA") and the Air
Transportation Association of America19 ("ATA"), had the sup-
port of many domestic and international air carriers,2" the Asso-
OF THE WARSAW CONVENTION, Order No. 96-11-6 (Nov. 12, 1996), available in
WESTLAW, Ftran-dot Database [hereinafter Order Approving Agreements].
12. See DOT Proposes Waiver of Liability Limits for Injury or Death on International
Flights, U.S. Dep't of Transp. News Release, Oct. 4, 1996, at 1, available in WESTLAW,
Ftran-nr Database [hereinafter DOT Proposes Waiver] (discussing IATA Intercarrier
Agreement).
13. See W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 75, at
534 (5th ed. 1984 & Supp. 1988) [hereinafter PROSSER & KEETON] (explaining doctrine
of strict liability). Under the doctrine of strict liability, a court can find a defendant
liable for negligence whether or not the defendant intended to interfere with a legally
protected interest or breached a duty to exercise reasonable care. Id.
14. JOHN DOWNES &JORDAN ELLIOT GOODMAN, FINANCE & INVESTMENT HANDBOOK
487 (3d ed. 1990). The International Monetary Fund regulates Special Drawing Rights
("SDRs"), a currency unit linked to the world's main currencies and informally called
.paper gold." Id. The use of SDRs helps preserve balance in the foreign exchange
market. Id. For example, if the U.S. Treasury notices that the British pound's value has
fallen sharply in comparison to the U.S. dollar, it can use its supply of SDRs to purchase
surplus British pounds in the foreign exchange market, thus increasing the value of the
remaining amount of British pounds. Id.
15. See DOT Approval Allows Liability Limits to be Abolished, AIR SAFETY WK., Nov. 18,
1996, available in WESTLAW, Airsafw Database [hereinafter DOT Approval] (providing
estimated valuation of SDRs as of Oct. 1996).
16. DOT Proposes Waiver, supra note 12, at 1.
17. Id.
18. DIEDER KS-VERSCHOOR, supra note 9, § 13.2, at 35 (1988). Almost all air carriers
are members of the International Aviation Transport Association ("IATA"), a private
trade association with strong ties to international governmental aviation authorities. Id.
IATA's goals include fostering safe, economical commercial air transportation for an
international public and furnishing a mechanism for cooperation among international
air carriers. Id.
19. Lee S. Kreindler, Goodbye to Liability Limitations, N.Y.LJ., Feb. 20, 1997 at 3.
Similar to international air carriers, U.S. flag air carriers have their own trade associa-
tion, the Air Transportation Association of America ("ATA"). Id.
20. Matthew L. Wald, Step to Raise Liability Limit in Air Crashes: U.S. Acts to Remove
Ceiling of $75,000, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 5, 1996, at 39.
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ciation of Trial Lawyers of America2 ("ATLA"), and the Interna-
tional Chamber of Commerce.22 Nevertheless, the DOT has
contemplated attaching additional conditions to the IATA Inter-
carrier Agreement which are likely to attract widespread criti-
cism in the future.21 Concurrently, the European Community24
has developed its own set of regulations on air carrier liability
("EC Proposal") .25 In addition, the Legal Committee of the In-
ternational Civil Aviation Organization 26 ("ICAO") has drafted a
new international convention to replace the Warsaw Conven-
27tion.
21. See Trial Lawyers Back Passenger Liability Limit Increases, AVqATION DAILY, Aug. 26,
1996, at 320 [hereinafter Trial Lawyers] (explaining that Association of Trial Lawyers of
America ("ATLA") urged approval of IATA Intercarrier Agreement because it would
improve passenger liability standards).
22. See ICC Urges DOT Approval of Higher Airline Liability Limits, AVIATION DAILY,
Aug. 22, 1996, at 306 [hereinafter ICC Urges DOT Approval] (quoting Jeffrey Shane,
Chairman of International Chamber of Commerce's Air Transport Commission, as stat-
ing that IATA Intercarrier Agreement "will effectively end the need for litigation. Air-
lines will provide fair compensation without limit, without the need to prove fault and
without delay.").
23. DOT Faces Wide Opposition to its Liability Limit Conditions, AVIATION DAILY, Oct.
28, 1996, at 154.
24. Treaty Establishing the European Community, Feb. 7, 1992, [1992] 1 C.M.L.R.
573 [hereinafter EC Treaty], incorporating changes made by Treat), on European Union,
Feb. 7, 1992, OJ. C 224/1 (1992), [1992] 1 C.M.L.R. 719, 31 I.L.M. 247 [hereinafter
TEU]. The TEU, supra, amended the Treaty Establishing the European Economic
Community, Mar. 25, 1957, 298 U.N.T.S. 11, 1973 Gr. Brit. T.S. No. 1 (Cmd. 5179-II)
[hereinafter EEC Treaty], as amended by Single European Act, O.J. L 169/1 (1987),
[1987] 2 C.M.L.R. 741 [hereinafter SEA], in TREATIES ESTABLISHING THE EUROPEAN
COMMUNITIES (EC Offl Pub. Off. 1987). Until 1995, the twelve European Union Mem-
ber States were Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxem-
bourg, the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, and the United Kingdom. TEU, supra, pmbl.
On January 1, 1995, Austria, Finland, and Sweden became European Union Member
States. See Hugh Carney, Sweden Gives Clear Yes to EU." Vote in Favour of Membership Keeps
Enlargement Timetable on Course, FIN. TIMES, Nov. 14, 1995, at 1 (reporting accession of
new Member States).
25. See Commission of the European Communities, Proposal for a Council Regula-
tion (EC) on Air Carrier Liability In Case of Accidents, COM (95) 724 Final, at 18
(1995) [hereinafter EC Proposal].
26. See LAWRENCE B. GOLDHIRSCH, THE WARSAW CONVENTION ANNOTATED: A LEGAL
HANDBOOK 3-4 (1988) (describing International Civil Aviation Organization ("ICAO")
and its duties). The ICAO, an agency of the United Nations located in Montreal, Can-
ada, governs the administration of the Warsaw convention and its associated treaties.
Id.
27. International Effort to Update 68-year Old Treaty on Passenger Liability Picks Up Mo-
mentum, AIRLNE FIN. NEWS, May 19,1997, available in WESTLAW, Airfin Database [here-
inafter International Effort] (reporting ICAO efforts to reform Warsaw Convention's lia-
bility limits).
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This Note examines recent attempts to resolve over sixty
years of criticism of the Warsaw Convention's liability limits.
Part I discusses the Warsaw Convention, the international com-
munity's efforts to expand the liability provisions of the Warsaw
Convention, and judicial treatment of the Warsaw Convention's
liability limits in the United States. Part II describes recent pro-
posals to resolve the issue of liability limits, including the IATA
Intercarrier Agreement, the DOT's proposed conditions to the
IATA Intercarrier Agreement, the EC Proposal on air carrier lia-
bility, and the ICAO's draft of a new international convention.
Part III argues that the IATA Intercarrier Agreement does not
eliminate the need to amend the Warsaw Convention's liability
provisions because contractual agreements such as the IATA In-
tercarrier Agreement cannot achieve the dual goals of uniform
liability limits and systematic legal procedures foreseen by the
Warsaw Convention's drafters. This Note concludes that global
adoption of a new international convention is the best means of
regulating air carrier liability given the complexities of the
worldwide aviation industry today.
I. THE WARSAW CONVENTION, SUBSEQUENT
INTERNATIONAL EFFORTS TO MODIFY THE WARSAW
CONVENTION, AD JUDICIAL INTERPRETATIONS OF THE
WARSAW CONVENTION
The Warsaw Convention regulates the liability of air carriers
involved in international aviation.2 1 Subsequent to 1929, criti-
cism of the Warsaw Convention's low liability limits resulted in a
collection of international treaties and contractual agreements
which eroded the uniform liability limits desired by the Warsaw
Convention's drafters.2 9 In addition, judicial interpretations of
the Warsaw Convention have played havoc with the legal system
for resolving international aviation disputes that the drafters an-
ticipated setting up sixty years ago.3 0
28. See 1 KREINDLER, supra note 1, § 10.01, at 10-2 (noting that Warsaw Convention
establishes legal procedures controlling rights of passengers against international air
carriers).
29. See David I. Sheinfeld, Comment, From Warsaw to Tenerife: A Chronological Analy-
sis of the Liability Limitations Imposed Pursuant to the Warsaw Convention, 45 J. AIR L. &
COM. 653, 656-57 (1980) (noting inequities created by amendments to Warsaw Conven-
tion).
30. Id.
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A. The Warsaw Convention
Aiming to ensure the growth of the developing aviation in-
dustry, the drafters of the Warsaw Convention assembled a uni-
form set of liability limits and systematic methods for settling
legal claims resulting from international air travel.3 1 The provi-
sions of the Warsaw Convention govern the extent of an air car-
rier's liability for both passenger and cargo claims resulting from
international aviation accidents.32  Shortly after ratification,
widespread criticism of the Warsaw Convention's liability limits
led to discussions concerning possible revisions.33
1. Purposes of the Warsaw Convention
In 1929, twenty-three nations enacted the Warsaw Conven-
tion3 4 as a result of two conferences, one held in Paris35 and an-
other in Warsaw.3 6 These conferences aimed at aiding the devel-
oping international aviation industry.37 The drafters' goals 38 in-
31. See Lowenfeld & Mendelsohn, supra note 1, at 498-99 (setting forth goals of
Warsaw Convention drafters).
32. See 1 KREINDLER, supra note 1, § 10.01, at 10-2 (describing nature of legal
claims treatment under Warsaw Convention).
33. See Lowenfeld & Mendelsohn, supra note 1, at 502-03 (detailing widespread
criticism of Warsaw Convention throughout international aviation community).
34. Warsaw Convention, supra note 3, 49 Stat. at 3023-25, 137 L.N.T.S. at 33-37.
Delegates from Germany, Austria, Belgium, Brazil, Denmark, Spain, France, Great Brit-
ain, Australia, South Africa, Greece, Italy, Japan, Latvia, Luxembourg, Norway, the
Netherlands, Poland, Rumania, Switzerland, Czechoslovakia, the Union of Soviet Social-
ist Republics, and Yugoslavia signed the Warsaw Convention on October 12, 1929. Id.
49 Stat. at 3023-25, 137 L.N.T.S. at 33-37.
35. SECOND INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON PRIVATE AERONAUTICAL LAW, MINUTES,
Oct. 4-12, 1929, at 18 (Robert C. Homer & Didier Legrez trans., Fred B. Rothman &
Co. 1975) [hereinafter MINUTES]. The Paris Conference created the Comit6 Interna-
tional Technique d'ExpertsJuridiques Ariens ("CITEJA"), a permanent group of legal
experts charged with developing a draft convention on international air carrier liability.
Id. at 18-19. As the aviation industry began to grow during the 1920's, national govern-
ments and commercial air carriers both began to explore the consequences of an air
carrier accident. See Sheinfeld, supra note 29, at 657 (discussing Paris Conference).
Due to this concern, the French Government convened the First International Confer-
ence on Private Aeronautical Law in Paris in 1925. Id.
36. MINUTES, supra note 35, at 18. Thirty countries, the League of Nations, and the
International Commission of Air Navigation sent delegates to the Warsaw Conference.
Id. at 5-10. The United States sent a nonvoting observer rather than a voting delegate.
Id. at 10.
37. See Dunn v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 589 F.2d 408, 410-11 (9th Cir. 1978)
(describing aviation industry's early problems). One of the industry's main problems
was obtaining capital while contending with enormous risks because, without limited
liability, a single accident might eliminate a large capital investment. Id.; see also 1 KREi-
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cluded the establishment of uniform liability limits for death and
bodily injury in aviation accidents 9 and systematic procedures
for resolving legal claims associated with international air
travel.4 ° By providing uniform liability limits, the drafters sought
to ensure that the aviation industry could obtain the necessary
capital for its future growth.4 1 Theoretically, limited liability
would attract investors and insurance underwriters who might
otherwise fear the possible bankruptcy resulting from a cata-
strophic accident.4 2 Systematic procedures for handling interna-
tional air transport claims would help simplify an industry poten-
NDLER, supra note 1, § 10.01, at 10-3 (noting financial requirements of aviation industry
in 1920s).
38. MINUTES, supra note 35, at 13. Karol Lutostanski, Dean of the Faculty of Law at
the University of Warsaw, during the opening session of the Warsaw Conference, de-
clared that the delegates had:
[G]athered in order to improve life, in order to render a legal text that daily
life urgently requires. International air carriage is multiplying, international
lines are being created, air travelers pass from country to country and even to
distant continents .... Common rules to regulate international air carriage
have become a necessity. Besides, it is necessary to fix rules of liability rightly
considered by the CITEJA as intimately bound up with the problem of trans-
portation.
Id.
39. See Lowenfeld & Mendelsohn, supra note 1, at 498-99 (discussing goals of War-
saw Conference). The delegates considered limiting air carrier liability as the more
important of the two goals. MINUTES, supra note 35, at 205. Regarding Articles 17, 18,
and 19 providing for air carrier liability for passengers, baggage, and damage due to
delay, Mr. Giannini, President of the Warsaw Conference Preparatory Committee,
pointed out that "[a]s our colleagues certainly recall, these are perhaps the most impor-
tant articles of the Convention." Id.
40. MINUTES, supra note 35, at 11. During his opening remarks at the Warsaw Con-
ference, Mr. Zaleski, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Poland, declared
that "[t]oday the air is conquered; beside communication by land transport and by sea,
air navigation has become a reality. But this new means of communication requires not
only organization, it requires further the creation of provisions of law analogous to
those which regulate the other means of communication." Id.; see also Lowenfeld &
Mendelsohn, supra note 1, at 498-99 (discussing goals of Warsaw Conference).
41. Lowenfeld & Mendelsohn, supra note 1, at 498-500.
42. Id. When he delivered the Warsaw Convention to the U.S. Senate in 1934,
Secretary of State Cordell Hull wrote that:
[T]he principle of limitation of liability will not only be beneficial to passen-
gers and shippers as affording a more definite basis of recovery and as tending
to lessen litigation, but ... it will prove to be an aid in the development of
international air transportation, as such limitation will afford the carrier a
more definite and equitable basis on which to obtain insurance rates, with the
probable result that there would eventually be a reduction of operating ex-
penses for the carrier and advantages to travelers and shippers in the way of
reduced transportation charges.
Senate Comm. on Foreign Relations, Message from the President of the U.S. Transmitting a
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tially complicated by the use of different languages and cus-
toms.
4 3
The Warsaw Convention came into effect on February 13,
1933, 4 ninety days after ratification by five High Contracting
Parties. 5 Twelve countries, including most of Europe, were par-
ties to the Warsaw Convention by the end of 1933.46 The United
States became a party to the Warsaw Convention on July 31,
1934,17 after the advice and consent-of the U.S. Senate."
2. Warsaw Convention Provisions
Unless a court reaches a finding of willful misconduct on
the part of an air carrier, the liability provisions of the Warsaw
Convention severely curtail the amount and kind of damages re-
coverable from the air carrier for the death or bodily injury of a
passenger.49 The Warsaw Convention restricts passengers to one
of four jurisdictional fora for purposes of filing claims against air
carriers.5 The purpose behind the Warsaw Convention's notice
provisions is to ensure that air carriers provide passengers with
sufficient time to make informed decisions regarding the
purchase of additional air travel insurance.51
Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules, S. EXEC. Doc. No. G., 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 3-
4 (1934), reprinted in 1934 U.S. Aviation Rep. 239, 242.
43. Lowenfeld & Mendelsohn, supra note 1, at 498-99. The delegates believed that
it was necessary to establish uniformity regarding tickets, waybills, and procedures for
handling legal claims because the delegates perceived the aviation industry as servicing
and connecting many countries with different languages, customs, and legal systems.
Id.
44. Id. at 501-02.
45. Warsaw Convention, supra note 3, art. 37, 49 Stat. at 3022, 137 L.N.T.S. at 31.
46. See Lowenfeld & Mendelsohn, supra note 1, at 501-02 (discussing ratification
process).
47. Warsaw Convention, supra note 3, pmbl., 49 Star. at 3013.
48. See Lowenfeld & Mendelsohn, supra note 1, at 501-502 (discussing U.S. adher-
ence to Warsaw Convention). The Constitution gives the President of the United States
the power to make treaties "by and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate, provided
two-thirds of the Senators present concur." U.S. CONST. art II, § 2, cl. 2.
49. See 1 KREINDLER, supra note 1, §10.05[4], at 10-76 to 10-77 (explaining effect of
Article 25 on air carrier's ability to take advantage of Warsaw Convention's liability limit
protections).
50. Warsaw Convention, supra note 3, art 28(1), 49 Stat. at 3020-21, 137 L.N.T.S. at
27-29.
51. See 1 KREINDLER, supra note 1, § 10.05[1], at 10-66 (explaining goal of Article 3
ticketing requirement).
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a. Liability Provisions
Article 17 imposes liability on air carriers if an accident
causing death or bodily injury to a passenger occurs while a pas-
senger is on board a plane or is embarking or disembarking.12
If an air carrier proves that it took all necessary steps to avoid
damage, Article 20 excuses the air carrier from liability.5" Simi-
larly, if an air carrier establishes that a passenger's actions con-
tributed to his or her injury or death, a forum court's.5 4 law on
contributory55 or comparative negligence56 will apply to reduce
the extent of the air carrier's liability. 5
7
Article 22 of the Warsaw Convention limits an air carrier's
52. Warsaw Convention, supra note 3, art. 17, 49 Stat. at 3018, 137 L.NT.S. at 25.
Article 17 provides that:
The carrier shall be liable for damage sustained in the event of the death or
wounding of a passenger or any other bodily injury suffered by a passenger, if
the accident which caused the damage so sustained took place on board the
aircraft or in the course of any of the operations of embarking or disembark-
ing.
Id. at 3018, 137 L.N.T.S. at 25.
53. Id. art. 20, 49 Stat. at 3019, 137 L.N.T.S. at 25. Article 20 provides as follows:
(1) The carrier shall not be liable if he proves that he and his agents have
taken all necessary measures to avoid the damage or that it was impossible for
him or them to take such measures.
(2) In the transportation of goods and baggage the carrier shall not be
liable if he proves that the damage was occasioned by an error in piloting, in
the handling of the aircraft, or in navigation and that, in all other respects, he
and his agents have taken all necessary measures to avoid the damage.
Id. at 3019, 137 L.N.T.S. at 25.
54. See BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 655 (6th ed. 1990) [hereinafter BLACK] (defining
forum court as particular court of justice, judicial tribunal, or place of jurisdiction
where plaintiff seeks judicial or administrative remedy for legal complaints).
55. See PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 13, § 65, at 451 (canvassing current law on
contributory negligence). Contributory negligence is behavior by the plaintiff, contrib-
uting as a legal cause to the injury he has suffered, which falls below the standard which
he is required to follow for his own safety. Id.
56. See id. § 67, at 471-72 (examining law on comparative negligence). Under the
doctrine of comparative negligence, a plaintiff's contributory negligence decreases his
damages in proportion to how much his own behavior contributed as a legal cause to
his injury. Id.
57. Warsaw Convention, supra note 3, art. 21, 49 Stat. at 3019, 137 L.N.T.S. at 25.
Article 21 states that "[i]f the carrier proves that the damage was caused by or contrib-
uted to by the negligence of the injured person the court may, in accordance with the
provisions of its own law, exonerate the carrier wholly or partly from his liability." Id. at
3019, 137 L.N.T.S. at 25. A court trying a Warsaw Convention case must apply its own
law because each country has its own rules on contributory negligence or comparative
negligence. See GOLDHIRSCH, supra note 26, at 97 (discussing requirements of Article 21
of Warsaw Convention).
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liability for each passenger to 125,000 Poincar francs,5" valued
in 1929 at approximately US$8300.59 Despite the limited liability
provisions, Article 22 allows air carriers to contract with passen-
gers to pay a higher amount of damages.6° Article 23, however,
prohibits an air carrier from contracting with passengers to pay a
lower amount of damages.6" Under Article 25, an air carrier or
his agent will not receive the protection of limited liability if a
court finds the air carrier .or his agent liable for willful miscon-
duct.6 2 Accordingly, a passenger may recover beyond the liabil-
58. Warsaw Convention, supra note 3, art. 22(1), 49 Stat. at 3019, 137 L.N.T.S. at
25. Article 22(1) provides that:
In the transportation of passengers the liability of the carrier for each passen-
ger shall be limited to the sum of 125,000 francs. Where, in accordance with
the law of the court to which the case is submitted, damages may be awarded
in the form of periodical payments, the equivalent capital value of the said
payments shall not exceed 125,000 francs. Nevertheless, by special contract,
the carrier and the passenger may agree to a higher limit of liability.
Id. at 3019, 137 L.N.T.S. at 25.
59. See GOLDHIRSCH, supra note 26, at 95-96 (providing valuation of Poincar6
francs as adjusted for 1929). The delegates chose to use the French gold standard of
the Poincar6 franc for the Warsaw Convention's liability limits as a means of avoiding
the consequences of a possible devaluation in any local currency. Id. A French court
could easily convert a damage award into local currency because the Poincar6 franc and
the French franc had equivalent values in 1929. Id. Courts outside of France had to
calculate damage awards in local currency units based on the value of the Poincar
franc. Id.
60. Warsaw Convention, supra note 3, art. 22(1), 49 Stat. at 3019, 137 L.N.T.S. at
25; see 1 KRtINDIER, supra note 1, § 10.01 [3], at 10-6 (explaining ability of air carriers to
opt out of Warsaw Convention's liability scheme).
61. Warsaw Convention, supra note 3, art. 23, 49 Stat. at 3020, 137 L.N.T.S. at 27.
Article 23 provides as follows:
Any provision tending to relieve the carrier of liability or to fix a lower limit
than that which is laid down in this convention shall be null and void, but the
nullity of any such provision shall not involve the nullity of the whole contract,
which shall remain subject to the provisions of this convention.
Id. at 3020, 137 L.N.T.S. at 27.
62. Id. art. 25, 49 Stat. at 3020, 137 L.N.T.S. at 27. According to Article 25:
(1) The carrier shall not be entitled to avail himself of the provisions of
this convention which exclude or limit his liability, if the damage is caused by
his wilful misconduct or by such default on his part as, in accordance with the
law of the court to which the case is submitted, is considered to be equivalent
to wilful misconduct.
(2) Similarly the carrier shall not be entitled to avail himself of the said
provisions, if the damage is caused under the same circumstances by any agent
of the carrier acting within the scope of his employment.
Id. at 3020, 137 L.N.T.S. at 27. The use of the term wilful misconduct in Article 25
resulted from debate among the drafters concerning the correct translation of the
French term dol. MINUTES, supra note 35, at 59-62. The drafters faced a dilemma be-
cause no such concept as dol existed in common law jurisdictions. See GOLDIIRSCH,
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ity limits by proving that an air carrier engaged in willful miscon-
duct.63
b. Jurisdiction Provisions
Under Article 28, plaintiffs may sue for damages in only one
of four fora, including the state of the air carrier's domicile,
64
the air carrier's principal state of business,65 the state where the
passenger contracted for air travel, or the state of the passen-
ger's destination.66 Article 32 prohibits any alteration of the
Warsaw Convention's jurisdictional provisions, even by mutual
agreement between a passenger and an air carrier.67 Article 29
supra note 26, at 121 (discussing use of term dol in official French text of Warsaw Con-
vention). The term dol suggests "an act or omission that was done intentionally to cause
a harm." Id. The common law concept closest to dol is willful misconduct which does
not require intent. Id. Willful misconduct can involve "a reckless act or omission with
the knowledge, sometimes implied, that harm will occur." Id. It is therefore more diffi-
cult for a plaintiff to prove dol than willful misconduct because intent is not a required
element for willful misconduct. Id.
63. Warsaw Convention, supra note 3, arts. 25(1), 25(2), 49 Stat. at 3020, 137
L.N.T.S. at 27.
64. See 1 KREINDLER, supra note 1, § 10.06, at 10-90 (discussing interpretation of
domicile in Article 28(1)). The domicile of the air carrier is the air carrier's place of
incorporation. Id.
65. See GOLDHIRSCH, supra note 26, at 145 (explaining interpretation of air car-
rier's principal place of business in Article 28(1)). An air carrier has only one principal
place of business. Id. An air carrier's principal place of business is that place where the
air carrier transacts the majority of its business. See DIEDERIKS-VERSCHOOR, Supra note 9,
at 67 (discussing interpretation of air carrier's principal place of business in Article
28(1)).
66. Warsaw Convention, supra note 3, art. 28(1), 49 Stat. at 3020-21, 137 L.N.T.S.
at 27-29. Article 28 provides that:
(1) An action for damages must be brought, at the option of the plaintiff,
in the territory of one of the High Contracting Parties, either before the court
of the domicile of the carrier or of his principal place of business, or where he
has a place of business through which the contract has been made, or before
the court at the place of destination.
(2) Questions of procedure shall be governed by the law of the court to
which the case is submitted.
Id. at 3020-21, 137 L.N.T.S. at 27-29. The destination of a flight is the final stop indi-
cated on the ticket regardless of whether more than one air carrier provided transporta-
tion to the passenger. See DIEDERIKS-VERSCHOOR, supra note 9, at 68 (discussing inter-
pretation of destination in Article 28(1)).
67. Warsaw Convention, supra note 3, art. 32, 49 Stat. at 3021, 137 L.N.T.S. at 29-
31. According to Article 32:
Any clause contained in the contract and all special agreements entered
into before the damage occurred by which the parties purport to infringe the
rules laid down by this convention, whether by deciding the law to be applied,
or by altering the rules as to jurisdiction, shall be null and void.
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requires plaintiffs to file suit within two years of the date of an
accident. 68
c. Notice Provisions
Under Article 3, air carriers must provide air travelers with
tickets setting forth the Warsaw Convention's liability provi-
sions," the air carrier's name and address,7" the location and
date of ticket issuance, 71 the place of departure and destina-
tion,72 and any interim stops. 73 If an air carrier issues an inaccu-
rate ticket or a passenger loses a ticket, the provisions of the
Warsaw Convention still apply.74 If an air carrier fails to deliver
the prescribed ticket to an air traveler, the air carrier may not
benefit from the Warsaw Convention liability limits. 75
3. Criticism of the Warsaw Convention
The Warsaw Convention came under criticism almost imme-
diately after ratification, mainly for its liability provisions. 76 Pro-
ponents of increased liability limits noted that, in countries such
as the United States, Great Britain, and France, damage awards
Id. at 3021, 137 L.N.T.S. at 29-31.
68. Id. art. 29, 49 Stat. at 3021, 137 L.N.T.S. at 29.
69. Id. art. 3(1)(e), 49 Stat. at 3015, 137 L.N.T.S. at 17.
70. Id. art. 3(1)(d), 49 Stat. at 3015, 137 L.N.T.S. at 17.
71. Id. art. 3(1)(a), 49 Stat. at 3015, 137 L.N.T.S. at 15.
72. Id. art. 3(l)(b), 49 Stat. at 3015, 137 L.N.T.S. at 15.
73. Id. art. 3(1)(c), 49 Stat. at 3015, 137 L.N.T.S. at 17. Article 3(l)(c) further
provides that "[t]he carrier may reserve the right to alter the stopping places in case of
necessity, and that if he exercises that right, the alteration shall not have the effect of
depriving the transportation of its international character." Id. at 3015, 137 L.N.T.S. at
17.
74. Id. art. 3(2), 49 Stat. at 3015, 137 L.N.T.S. at 17. Article 3(2) provides that:
The absence, irregularity, or loss of the passenger ticket shall not affect the
existence or the validity of the contract of transportation, which shall none the
less be subject to the rules of this convention. Nevertheless, if the carrier ac-
cepts a passenger without a passenger ticket having been delivered he shall
not be entitled to avail himself of those provisions of this convention which
exclude or limit his liability.
Id. at 3015, 137 L.N.T.S. at 17.
75. Id.
76. Lowenfeld & Mendelsohn, supra note 1, at 502. CITEJA began discussing po-
tential revisions to the Warsaw Convention in 1935. Id. at 502. In addition, the ICAO's
Legal Committee extensively discussed proposed changes to the Warsaw Convention.
Id. Politicians, legal scholars, practitioners, and lay commentators also criticized the
Warsaw Convention. See 1 SPEISER & KRAUSE, supra note 2, §§ 11:17, 11:18, at 669-70
(discussing dissatisfaction with Warsaw Convention's liability provisions).
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in personal injury and death actions exceeded the limits permit-
ted by the Warsaw Convention. 77 In contrast, many Latin Ameri-
can countries declined to adhere to the Warsaw Convention be-
cause they asserted that the liability limits were set too high.78
B. Subsequent Efforts to Modify the Warsaw Convention Regarding
its Liability Provisions
In 1955, the Hague Protocol 79 raised the Warsaw Conven-
tion's liability limits.8" In 1966, continued criticism of the War-
saw Convention and the Hague Protocol liability limits81 led to
the adoption of a contractual agreement ("Montreal Interim
Agreement")82 that subjected signatory air carriers to absolute
liability up to a limit of US$75,000.83 Signatories to the Guate-
mala Protocol84 further increased the liability limit to approxi-
mately US$120,000 in 1971.85 Shortly thereafter, delegates to an
ICAO diplomatic conference substituted SDRs for the gold stan-
dard as the basis of payment for the Warsaw Convention's liabil-
ity limits.86 As a result of a more recent contractual agreement, a
77. Lowenfeld & Mendelsohn, supra note 1, at 504. As air safety improved over
time, air carriers could obtain liability insurance at reduced rates. Id. Critics of the
Warsaw Convention's low liability limits also argued that increased insurance expenses
would represent only a small portion of an air carrier's cost of operations. Id.
78. Id. In many countries, the value of the Poincar6 gold franc had increased due
to the global departure from the gold standard, thus raising the value of the Warsaw
Convention liability limits. Id.
79. Protocol to Amend the Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules Relat-
ing to International Carriage by Air, Sept. 28, 1955, 478 U.N.T.S. 371 [hereinafter
Hague Protocol].
80. See 1 SPEISER & KRAUSE, supra note 2, § 11:18, at 671-72 (discussing Hague Pro-
tocol). In order to preserve the Warsaw Convention's original goal of uniformity, the
delegates to the Hague Conference purposely decided to adopt a protocol to the War-
saw Convention instead of rewriting the treaty. Id.
81. See Ray B. Jeffrey, Comment, The Growth of American Judicial Hostility Towards the
Liability Limitations of the Warsaw Convention, 48 J. AIR L. & COM., 805, 812 (describing
criticism of limited liability under Warsaw Convention and Hague Protocol).
82. Order of Civil Aeronautics Board Approving Increases in Liability Limitations
of Warsaw Convention and Hague Protocol, CAB Agreement 18900, adopted on May
13, 1966, 49 U.S.C. § 1502 (1988) [hereinafter Montreal Interim Agreement].
83. Id.
84. Protocol to Amend the Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules Relat-
ing to International Carriage by Air Signed at Warsaw on 12 October 1929 as Amended
by the Protocol Done at The Hague on 28 September 1955, Mar. 8 1971, 64 Dep't St.
Bull. 555 [hereinafter Guatemala Protocol]
85. Id. art. VIII, at 556-57.
86. See Sheinfeld, supra note 29, at 677-78 (discussing concerns over gold standard
in early 1970s)
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group of Japanese air carriers abandoned the Warsaw Conven-
tion's liability limits in 1992.7
1. The 1955 Hague Protocol
Delegates of twenty-six countries attended a diplomatic con-
ference at The Hague in 195588 ("Hague Conference") to con-
sider either raising the liability limits or narrowing the condi-
tions for unlimited air carrier liability.8 9 The resultant Hague
Protocol doubled the Warsaw Convention's liability limits for
death or injury to a passenger to 250,000 Poincar6 francs, or ap-
proximately US$16,600.90 The delegates also added a provision
allowing courts to award litigation expenses to passengers ac-
cording to local law.91 In addition, the Hague Protocol defined
willful misconduct to mean that air carriers would be subject to
unlimited liability for intentional or reckless acts causing injury
or death.92
87. See Naneen K. Baden, The Japanese Initiative on the Warsaw Convention, 61 J. AmR
L. & COM. 437, 453 (1996) (describing Japaneses air carrier abandonment of Warsaw
Convention liability limits).
88. See 1 SPEISER & KRAUSE, supra note 2, § 11:18, at 670-71 (discussing Hague Con-
ference). The ICAO's Legal Committee convened the International Conference on
Private Air Law in September 1955. Id.
89. See Lowenfeld & Mendelsohn, supra note 1, at 505 (discussing Hague Confer-
ence).
90. Hague Protocol, supra note 79, art. XI, 478 U.N.T.S. at 381. Article XI replaces
Article 22 of the Warsaw Convention. Id.
91. Id., art. XI, 478 U.N.T.S. at 381. Article XI, which replaces Article 22 of the
Warsaw Convention, states:
The limits prescribed in this article shall not prevent the court from awarding,
in accordance with its own law, in addition, the whole or part of the court costs
and of the other expenses of the litigation incurred by the plaintiff. The fore-
going provision shall not apply if the amount of the damages awarded, exclud-
ing court costs and other expenses of the litigation, does riot exceed the sum
which the carrier has offered in writing to the plaintiff within a period of six
months from the date of the occurrence causing the damage, or before the
commencement of the action, if that is later.
Id. at 381. The U.S. delegation to the Hague Conference pressed for the inclusion of
this provision because it sought maximum recoveries for injured passengers or their
survivors. See Lowenfeld & Mendelsohn, supra note 1, at 507-08 (discussing proposal to
raise liability limits).
92. Hague Protocol, supra note 79, art. XIII, 478 U.N.T.S. at 383. Article XIII,
which replaces Article 25 of the Warsaw Convention, states:
The limits of liability specifed in Article 22 shall not apply if it is proved that
the damage resulted from an act or omission of the carrier, his servants or
agents,-done with intent to cause damage or recklessly and with knowledge
that damage would probably result; provided that, in the case of such act or
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Despite its participation at the Hague Conference, the
United States never ratified or adhered to the Hague Protocol.9"
The United States remained dissatisfied with the Hague Proto-
col's revised liability limits.94 Accordingly, the original version of
the Warsaw Convention, including its liability limits of US$8300,
remained applicable in the United States.9 5 Over time, more
than 100 countries, including the majority of Europe, became
parties to the Hague Protocol. 96
2. The 1966 Montreal Interim Agreement
At the time of the Hague Conference, the international avi-
ation industry was well established and financially stable.97 Given
the industry's profitability and significant safety records, oppo-
nents of the Hague Protocol argued that air carriers no longer
required the protection of special liability limits.9" Proponents
of the Hague Protocol, however, noted the advantages to passen-
gers of the Hague Protocol's provision allowing courts to award
litigation expenses99 and more generally avoiding confusion due
to the existence of conflicting laws in the absence of an interna-
tional treaty. 100 These types of criticism of the Warsaw Conven-
tion and the Hague Protocol liability limits continued unabated
during the ten-year period following the Hague Conference. 10 '
In 1961, while the United States considered whether to for-
mally denounce the Warsaw Convention, 0 2 the U.S. Department
omission of a servant or agent, it is also proved that he was acting within the
scope of his employment.
Id. at 383.
93. 1 KREINDLER, supra note 1, § 11.01, at 11-2. The Hague Protocol went into
effect on August 1, 1963, 90 days subsequent to ratification by 30 countries. Id.
94. Id. U.S. persistence regarding higher liability limits was a major reason for
holding the Hague Conference initially. Id.
95. Id.
96. Id. § 11:03[04], at 11-11.
97. See Sheinfeld, supra note 29, at 660-61 (discussing status of international avia-
tion industry at time of Hague Conference).
98. SeeJeffrey, supra note 81, at 811-12 (canvassing opposition to Hague Protocol).
99. Hague Protocol, supra note 79, art. XI, 478 U.N.T.S. at 381.
100. See Lowenfeld & Mendelsohn, supra note 1, at 510 (discussing debate over
merits of Hague Protocol).
101. SeeJeffrey, supra note 81, at 812 (discussing criticism of the Warsaw Conven-
tion's and Hague Protocol's liability provisions).
102. Warsaw Convention, supra note 3, art. 39, 49 Stat. at 3022, 137 L.N.T.S. at 33.
Article 39 provides as follows:
(1) Any one of the High Contracting Parties may denounce this conven-
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of State requested that the Interagency Group on International
Aviation l0 3 ("IGIA") review the Warsaw Convention and the
Hague Protocol. 104 Instead of recommending denunciation of
the Warsaw Convention, the IGIA attempted to secure an agree-
ment between the five principal U.S. international air carriers
and the ATA to voluntarily raise liability limits to US$100,000.105
Thus, the IGIA proposal would have taken advantage of Article
22 of the Warsaw Convention, which provides that an air carrier
and its passengers may agree by special contract to raise liability
limits. 106 Although the ATA air carriers rejected the IGIA propo-
sal, 107 in September 1965 the international air carriers of the
IATA approved their own counter-proposal with a liability limit
of US$50,000. 08 IATA made the terms of the counter-proposal
contingent on U.S. ratification of the Hague Protocol. 10 9
Despite the IATA counter-proposal, on November 15, 1965,
don by a notification addressed to the Government of the Republic of Poland,
which shall at once inform the Government of each of the High Contracting
Parties.
(2) Denunciation shall take effect six months after the notification of de-
nunciation, and shall operate only as regards the party which shall have pro-
ceeded to denunciation.
Id. at 3022, 137 L.N.T.S. at 33; see BLACK, supra note 54, at 435 (defining denunciation
of treaty as "act of one nation in giving notice to another nation of its intention to
terminate an existing treaty between the two nations"). At the same time as the admin-
istration had serious misgivings regarding the Warsaw Convention, the U.S. Depart-
ment of State was also concerned that denunciation of the Warsaw Convention might
antagonize international governments to the detriment of American aviation interests
abroad. See Lowenfeld & Mendelsohn, supra note 1, at 533 (discussing Kennedy admin-
istration concerns regarding the Warsaw Convention denunciation).
103. Lowenfeld & Mendelsohn, supra note 1, at 533. During its review of the War-
saw Convention and the Hague Protocol, the Interagency Group on International Avia-
tion ("IGIA") also considered recommending a mandatory insurance program as a sup-
plemental proposal to ratification of the Hague Protocol. Id. at 535.
104. Id.
105. Id. at 547. In return, the IGIA proposed that the Kennedy administration
urge Congress to ratify the Hague Protocol. Id.
106. Warsaw Convention, supra note 3, art. 22(1), 49 Star. at 3019, 137 L.N.T.S. at
22; see Lowenfeld & Mendelsohn, supra note 1, at 547 (discussing IGIA proposal to raise
Warsaw Convention liability limits).
107. Lowenfeld & Mendelsohn, supra note 1, at 547-48. The IGIA proposal failed
because some of the air carriers refused to raise the liability limits higher than
US$50,000, while others refused to approve any increase unless all domestic and inter-
national air carriers agreed to raise the limits to the same amount. Id.
108. Id. at 547-49 (discussing IATA approval of US$50,000 liability limit).
109. See id. at 549. The U.S. administration viewed the IATA proposal as an indica-
tion that most air carriers did not comprehend how seriously the U.S. government
viewed the need to raise liability limits. Id.
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the United States formally denounced the Warsaw Conven-
tion. t t ° In its Notice of Denunciation, the U.S. Department of
State indicated that the United States would withdraw its denun-
ciation if, before May 15, 1966, there was a plausible possibility
for an international agreement temporarily raising liability limits
to US$75,000, followed by a subsequent increase to
US$100,000.'11 The U.S. position on increased liability limits
prompted fifty-nine countries, 112 including the United States, to
send delegates to an international conference held in Montreal,
Canada in February 1966 ("Montreal Conference")." 3 Although
the delegates could not reach an agreement before the end of
the conference,1 1 4 the United States and the international air
carriers continued negotiations, with IATA acting as an interme-
diary." 5 Finally, the United States and the international air car-
riers reached a compromise in the form of the Montreal Interim
Agreement, one day before the effective date of the United
States' Notice of Denunciation, May 15, 1966.116 Consequently,
the United States withdrew its Notice of Denunciation of the
110. CAB. Order E-22984, Dec. 15, 1965, 53 DEP'T ST. BuLL., at 923-25. The
American Embassy in Warsaw sent a diplomatic note to the Polish government, as the
depositary government for the Warsaw Convention, to formally register the United
States' denunciation. See Lowenfeld & Mendelsohn, supra note 1, at 551 (discussing
denunciation of Warsaw Convention).
111. See Lowenfeld & Mendelsohn, supra note 1, at 552 (discussing Notice of De-
nunciation of Warsaw Convention). May 15, 1966 was the effective date of the U.S.
Notice of Denunciation because, under Article 39 of the Warsaw Convention, a High
Contracting Party's denunciation would not take effect until six months after November
15, 1965, the filing date of the Notice of Denunciation with the Polish Government.
Warsaw Convention, supra note 3, art. 39, 49 Stat. at 3022, 137 L.N.T.S. at 33.
112. See Lowenfeld & Mendelsohn, supra note 1, at 563 (discussing Montreal In-
terim Agreement). Twenty-eight countries sending delegates to Montreal were parties
to both the Warsaw Convention and the Hague Protocol, twenty-two countries were
parties only to the Warsaw Convention, and nine countries were present due to their
membership in ICAO. Id. at 563 n.224.
113. See id. at 563 (discussing international conference held in Montreal, Canada
in February 1966 ("Montreal Conference")).
114. See id. at 564-66 (discussing reactions of delegates attending Montreal Confer-
ence). While many of the countries at the Montreal Conference were prepared to ac-
knowledge that the liability limits were too low, most of the countries viewed the U.S.
proposal for a US$100,000 per passenger limit as immoderate. Id. at 565. The ration-
ale for this view was that, if an individual was really worth that much money, he should
manage to insure himself. Id.
115. See 1 KREINDLER, supra note 1, § 12.02[4], at 12-7 (describing roles of the
United States and IATA at Montreal Conference).
116. See id. (discussing Montreal Interim Agreement).
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Warsaw Convention.1 1 7
The Montreal Interim Agreement is a contractual agree-
ment between air carriers who have signed the agreement and
passengers with tickets having points of departure, destination,
or agreed stopping places in the United States. 1 The basis for
the Montreal Interim Agreement is Article 22 of the Warsaw
Convention which allows an air carrier and its passengers to
agree by special contract to raise liability limits.11 9 Due to its
contractual nature, the Montreal Interim Agreement does not
amend the provisions of the Warsaw Convention or the Hague
Protocol.12 0 The Montreal Interim Agreement applies to any in-
ternational air travel that has a place of departure, agreed desti-
nation, or agreed stopping place in the United States.' 21 It im-
poses absolute liability upon participating air carriers up to
US$75,000.12 2 It also requires contracting air carriers to include
notice of the new liability limits on airline tickets issued to pas-
sengers.123  Although the United States intended the Montreal
Interim Agreement to be a temporary arrangement,1 2 4 the Mon-
treal Interim Agreement and the Warsaw Convention remain in
effect in the United States today.1
2 5
3. The 1971 Guatemala Protocol
After the United States withdrew its Notice of Denunciation,
it continued its efforts to change the Warsaw Convention's lim-
ited liability provisions because it viewed the Montreal Interim
Agreement as a temporary, non-governmental solution. 126  In
117. See Lowenfeld & Mendelsohn, supra note 1, at 596 (discussing U.S. withdrawal
of Notice of Denunciation of Warsaw Convention).
118. See Goldhirsch, supra note 26, at 7 (discussing Montreal Interim Agreement).
119. Warsaw Convention, supra note 3, art. 22(1), 49 Stat. at 3019, 137 L.N.T.S. at
25.
120. See 1 KREINDLER, supra note 1, § 12.03, at 12-7 (discussing legal framework of
Montreal Interim Agreement).
121. Montreal Interim Agreement, supra note 82. See DIEDERIKS-VERSCHOOR,
supra note 9, at 76 (discussing applicability of Montreal Interim Agreement).
122. Montreal Interim Agreement, supra note 82. See 1 SPEISER & KRAUSE, supra
note 2, § 11:19, at 679 (discussing provisions of Montreal Interim Agreement).
123. Montreal Interim Agreement, supra note 82, art. 2. See 1 KREINDLER, supra
note 1, § 12.02[5], at 12-7 (discussing provisions of Montreal Interim Agreement).
124. See Jeffrey, supra note 81, at 814 (discussing Montreal Interim Agreement).
125. See 1 KREINDLER, supra note 1, § 10.01 [5], at 10-11 (describing current status
of Montreal Interim Agreement).
126. See Nicolas M. Matte, The Warsaw System and the Hesitations of the U.S. Senate, 8
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March 1971, following a conference held in Guatemala City,
12 7
representatives from the United States and twenty other coun-
tries signed the Guatemala Protocol.1 28 The Guatemala Protocol
increased the Warsaw Convention's liability limits for passenger
death or personal injury to 1,500,000 Poincar6 francs, or approx-
imately US$120,000. 29 The Guatemala Protocol also provided
for periodic reviews of liability limits,1 30 strict liability in cases of
death or personal injury," 1 and the possibility of supplemental
national insurance plans to further protect air travelers. 132 Addi-
tionally, the Guatemala Protocol provided that courts could im-
pose legal fees on an air carrier who refuses to settle a claim
within a six-month period after receiving written notification of a
settlement amount.1 33 Although the Guatemala Protocol's draft-
ers intended these provisions to appease the United States, the
U.S. administration never submitted the Guatemala Protocol to
the Senate for ratification because the Guatemala Protocol
ANNALS OF AIR & SPACE L. 151, 157-58 (1983) (discussing Montreal Interim Agreement
and Guatemala Protocol).
127. INT'L CIVIL AVIATION ORG., INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON AIR LAW, GUATE-
MALA CITY, FEBRUARY-MARCH 1971, ICAO Doc. 9040-LC/167-1,167-2 (1972).
128. See 1 SPEISER & KRAUSE, supra note 2, § 11:20, at 680 (discussing Guatemala
Protocol).
129. Guatemala Protocol, supra note 84, art. VIII, at 556-57.
130. Id. art. XV, at 558.
131. Id. art. VI, at 556. The Guatemala Protocol provides a strict liability standard
instead of a negligence standard. See 1 SPEISER & KRAUSE, supra note 2, § 11:20, at 683
n.40 (discussing Guatemala Protocol's revisions of Warsaw Convention).
132. Guatemala Protocol, supra note 84, art. XIV, at 557. Article XIV states that a
supplemental national insurance plan shall meet the following conditions:
a) it shall not in any circumstances impose upon the carrier, his servants
or agents, any liability in addition to that provided under this Convention;
b) it shall not impose upon the carrier any financial or administrative
burden other than collecting in that State contributions from passengers if
required to do so;
c) it shall not give rise to any discrimination between carriers with regard
to the passengers concerned and the benefits available to the said passengers
under the system shall be extended to them regardless of the carrier whose
services they have used;
d) if a passenger has contributed to the system, any person suffering dam-
age as a consequence of death or personal injury of such passenger shall be
entitled to the benefits of the system.
Id. The last condition of the Guatemala Protocol's provision for supplemental national
insurance plans broadened the reach an air carrier's liability. See Sheinfeld, supra note
29, at 673-74 (discussing Guatemala Protocol provision for supplemental insurance
plan).
133. Guatemala Protocol, supra note 84, art. VIII(3), at 556-57; see Matte, supra
note 126, at 157 (discussing provisions of Guatemala Protocol).
1997] THE WARSAW CONVENTION 1787
linked liability limits to the fluctuating price of gold. 13 4  The
Guatemala Protocol is not in force anywhere in the world be-
cause the language of its ratification clause, requires, in effect,
ratification by the United States as a necessary prerequisite of
the Guatemala Protocol ratification process.13 5
4. The 1975 Montreal Protocols
Due to fluctuations of gold prices in the international mon-
etary system,13 6 the ICAO convened a diplomatic conference
13 7
("ICAO Conference") in Montreal in 1975.138 The resultant
four protocols 139 ("Montreal Protocols") substituted SDRs141 for
134. See Matte, supra note 126, at 158 (discussing Nixon administration's decision
not to seek ratification of Guatemala Protocol).
135. Guatemala Protocol, supra note 84, art. XX(1), at 558. According to the Gua-
temala Protocol, thirty countries must ratify the Guatemala Protocol and:
[T]he total international scheduled air traffic, expressed in passenger-kilime-
ters, according to the statistics for the year 1970 published by the International
Civil Aviation Organization, of the airlines of five States which have ratified
this Protocol, [must equal] at least 40% of the total international scheduled
air traffic of the airlines of the member States of the International Civil Avia-
tion Organization in that year.
Id. The drafters included this requirement to avoid the possibility that, similar to the
Hague Protocol, only a small number of states would ratify the Guatemala Protocol,
resulting in two different sets of liability limits existing concurrently in the international
aviation industry. See 1 SPEISER & KRAUSE, supra note 2, § 11:20, at 681 n.35 (discussing
Guatemala Protocol ratification process).
136. See Sheinfeld, supra note 29, at 677-78 (discussing worries over value of gold
in early 1970s). Weakness in the value of gold had caused concern in the foreign ex-
change markets and created the need for an alternative basis for the liability limits of
the Warsaw Convention other than the Poincar6 gold franc. Id.
137. See id. at 678 (discussing ICAO diplomatic conference held in Montreal in
1975 ("ICAO Conference")).
138. Id.
139. Warsaw Convention (Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules Relat-
ing to International Carriage By Air): Montreal Protocols 3 and 4 Providing Higher
Liability Limits, Sept. 25, 1975, ICAO Doc. 9147, 9148 [hereinafter Montreal Proto-
cols]. The Montreal Protocols amended the Warsaw Convention's liability limits for
passengers, baggage, and goods. Francis Lyall, The Warsaw Convention - Cutting the
Gordian Knot and the 1995 Intercarrier Agreement, 22 SYRACUSEJ. INT'L L. & COM. 67, 74-75
(1996). In addition, the fourth Montreal Protocol, which the ICAO Conference dele-
gates signed concurrently, addressed air cargo liability limits. Id. at 75.
140. DowNEs & GOODMAN, supra note 14, at 487. The International Monetary
Fund ("IMF") created the SDR in 1970 in response to concerns of monetary officials
that the supply of gold and U.S. dollars, the two principal reserve assets, would fail to
meet world demand and cause the U.S. dollar's value to increase excessively. Id. Origi-
nally, the IMF set the value of one SDR at a one-to-one ratio with the U.S. dollar and at
the dollar equivalent of other major currencies on January 1, 1970. Id. When world
governments switched to the current system of floating exchange rates, the SDR's value
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the gold standard as the basis for the Warsaw Convention's liabil-
ity limits.14 ' The International Monetary Fund 142 ("IMF") bases
the SDR currency unit on the currencies of France, Britain, Ja-
pan, Germany, and the United States.1 4 3 By using SDRs, the del-
egates sought to address criticism of the Warsaw Convention for
not considering the effect of inflation on liability limits.
144
The ICAO Conference delegates intended the third Mon-
treal Protocol 145 ("Montreal Protocol No. 3") to incorporate all
prior amendments to the Warsaw Convention.' 46 Accordingly,
Montreal Protocol No. 3 incorporated by reference the Guate-
mala Protocol's provision for a supplemental national insurance
plan.' 47 The ICAO Conference delegates set the liability limits
in Montreal Protocol No. 3 at 100,000 SDRs, or approximately
US$120,000.148
Montreal Protocol No. 3 remained in the U.S. Senate For-
shifted as compared to the "basket" of key currencies. Id. Greater dependence on
SDRs in settling international accounts corresponded to a decrease in the importance
of gold as a reserve asset. Id. The SDR's intrinsic stability relative to any one currency
has made it useful for determining the value of private contracts and international trea-
ties. Id.
141. See Matte, supra note 126, at 158 (discussing adoption of SDRs for Warsaw
Convention's liability limits). A gold standard is amonetary system under which cur-
rency units are exchangeable for set quantities of gold as an anti-inflationary device.
DOWNES & GOODMAN, supra note 14, at 299-300.
142. See BLAc, supra note 54, at 816 (defining International Monetary Fund
("IMF") as agency of United Nations). The IMF is responsible for reducing trade barri-
ers and stabilizing foreign currencies. DOWNES & GOODMAN, supra note 14, at 322-23.
143. See GOLDHIRSCH, supra note 26, at 97 (discussing SDR currency unit).
144. See Baden, supra note 87, at 446 (discussing SDR monetary unit).
145. Warsaw Convention (Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules Relat-
ing to International Carriage By Air): Montreal Protocols 3 Providing Higher Liability
Limits, Sept. 25, 1975, ICAO Doc. 9147 [hereinafter Montreal Protocol No. 3].
146. Id. art. I, ICAO Doc. 9147 at E-1. Article I states that "[t]he convention which
the provisions of the present Chapter modify is the Warsaw Convention as amended at
The Hague in 1955, and at Guatemala City in 1971." Id. at E-1; see Matte, supra note
126, at 158 (discussing Montreal Protocols).
147. Montreal Protocol No. 3, supra note 145, art. IV, ICAO Doc. 9147 at E-2.
148. Id. art. 11(1), at E-1. Article II(1) provides:
In the carriage of persons the liability of the carrier is limited to the sum of
100 000 [sic] Special Drawing Rights for the aggregate of the claims, however
founded, in respect of damage suffered as a result of the death or personal
injury of each passenger. Where, in accordance with the law of the court
seised of the case, damages may be awarded in the form of periodic payments,
the equivalent capital value of the said payments shall not exceed 100 000 [sic]
Special Drawing Rights.
Id.; see Sheinfeld, supra note 29 at 678 (discussing provisions of Montreal Protocol No.
3).
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eign Relations Committee and finally went before the Senate in
1983.149 Although the U.S. Senate Committee on Foreign Rela-
tions urged ratification of the Montreal Protocols,15 ° the Senate
itself failed to ratify the Protocols in 1983,1'' primarily due to the
Senate's preference for unlimited air carrier liability. 15 2 In addi-
tion, the Senate objected to the idea of a supplemental insur-
ance plan which appeared to imply that injured passengers
would effectively pay for their own damages. ' "
5. The 1992 Japanese Initiative
On November 20, 1992, ten Japanese air carriers voluntarily
waived the Warsaw Convention's liability limits ('Japanese Initia-
tive") 54 The Japanese Initiative relied on Article 22(1) of the
Warsaw Convention which allows air carriers to contractually
agree to pay passengers higher liability amounts than those spec-
ified in the Warsaw Convention.' 55 To execute their withdrawal
from the Warsaw Convention, the Japanese air carriers added
appropriate language concerning passenger liability on interna-
tional flights to their conditions of carriage.' 56
149. Matte, supra note 126, at 159. The Senate Foreign Relations Committee held
hearings on Montreal Protocol No. 3 in July 1977 and September 1981, but took no
action until February 1983 when the Committee recommended the Protocol to the
Senate for ratification. Id.
150. S. EXEC. REP. No., at 1 (1983).
151. David Shribman, Air Liability Treaty Rejected by Senate, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 9, 1983
at D6 (reporting Senate failure to ratify Montreal Protocols due to dissatisfaction with
Protocols' low liability limits).
152. See Matte, supra note 126, at 159-60 (describing Senate opposition to liability
limits as determining factor in Senate decision not to ratify Montreal Protocols). Dur-
ing the Senate debate, for example, Senator Ernest F. Hollings stated that:
In 1980, the Air Law Committee of the International Law Association recom-
mended unlimited liability for personal injuries or death to individual passen-
gers. This Air Law Committee consists of 38 distinguished international schol-
ars, many of whom have been instrumental in the development of the Warsaw
convention and its progeny of treaties .... When a group such as this puts it
[sic] support behind the proposition that airlines in international aviation
should be subject to unlimited liability, one would be hard-pressed to justify a
treaty to the contrary.
129 CONG. REc. S2,245 (daily ed. Mar. 7, 1983) (statement of Sen. Hollings).
153. Laurie M. Mcquade, Note, Tragedy as a Catalyst for Reform: The American Way?,
11 CONN. J. INT'L. L. 325, 331-32 (1996).
.154. See Baden, supra note 87, at 453 (discussing Japanese air carrier abandon-
ment of Warsaw Convention liability limits).
155. Warsaw Convention, supra note 3, art. 22(1), 49 Stat. at 3019, 137 L.N.T.S. at
25.
156. See Baden, supra note 87, at 455 (discussing Japanese Initiative). The Japa-
1790 FORDHAMINTERNATIONALLAWJOURNAL [Vol. 20:1768
The Japanese air carriers made their decision to raise liabil-
ity limits after the 1985 crash of ajapan Air Lines ('JAL") Boeing
747 which killed over 500 people. 5 7 The 1985 JAL accident
drew attention to an inconsistency in Japanese airline regula-
tions.15 8 Passengers traveling on domestic flights in Japan were
entitled to unlimited liability, while passengers with interna-
tional tickets traveling on the same aircraft were entitled only to
limited liability.' 59 Additionally, private settlements between the
victims' families and JAL in the 1985 disaster averaged
US$800,000 per passenger. 160 Many Japanese regarded the dis-
parity between the amount of such private settlements and the
size ofjudicial awards capped by the Warsaw Convention's liabil-
ity limits as dishonorable.' 6'
The less adversarial Japanese legal system favors settlement
arrangements over litigation.' 61 Civil suits occur only as a last
resort because filing a complaint against someone in Japan cre-
ates societal discord. 163 During the period of 1977-82, for exam-
nese air carriers added the following two paragraphs to their conditions of carriage as
printed on each passenger ticket:
Each airline shall not apply the applicable limit of liability in Article 22(1) of
the Warsaw convention in defense of any claim arising out of the death,
wounding or other bodily injury of a passenger within the meaning of the
convention.
Each airline shall not use any defense for negligence as stated in Article 20(1)
of the Warsaw Convention up to 100,000 SDRs... but will use those defenses
thereafter, excluding legal costs awarded by a court.
Stacy Shapiro, Debate Rages on Airline Liability Caps, Bus. INS., Mar. 15, 1993, at 3 (noting
changed language of conditions of carriage due to Japanese Initiative).
157. See Baden, supra note 87, at 453 (discussing Japanese air carrier abandon-
ment of Warsaw Convention's liability limits); see Shapiro, supra note 156, at 3 (noting
that 1985JAL air disaster led to adoption by Japanese air carriers of changed conditions
of carriage).
158. See Shapiro, supra note 156, at 3 (explaining disparity in Japanese airline reg-
ulations).
159. Id.
160. See Baden, supra note 87, at 454 (discussing private settlements in the 1985
JAL air disaster).
161. See id. at 454 (reviewing Japanese reaction to private settlements in 1985JAL
disaster).
162. See ROBERT C. CHRISTOPHER, THE JAPANESE MIND 164-65 (1983) (discussing
Japanese police negotiations of financial settlements between parties to traffic collision
at accident scene). So frequent is the settlement arrangement approach that the
number of civil lawsuits filed in Japan annually equals a fraction of comparable U.S.
statistics. Id. at 165.
163. Id. at 165-66.
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pie, fifty-seven passengers died in two JAL crashes. 164 Yet none
of the victims' relatives filed a complaint againstJAL as a conse-
quence.
1 65
Aviation industry observers originally theorized that other
air carriers would follow the Japanese example because the Japa-
nese Initiative could reduce litigation. 66 These observers hy-
pothesized that such a reduction in litigation would result from
allowing victims' families to settle directly with air carriers who
could then seek reimbursement from aircraft manufacturers. 167
Other international air carriers did not adopt the Japanese Initi-
ative's provisions because of fear that insurance costs would in-
crease as a result of such industry-wide action. 161
C. Judicial Interpretations of the Warsaw Convention
Dissatisfaction with the low liability limits of the Warsaw
Convention has led to various judicial methods of skirting those
limits over the years. 169 U.S. courts have questioned whether the
Warsaw Convention demands an independent basis for a cause
of action.17 ° The Warsaw Convention's limitation of damage re-
coveries has resulted in strict factual scrutiny by courts to deter-
mine whether a passenger's injury or death depended upon the
occurrence of an accident that took place while the passenger
164. Id. at 165.
165. Id. The majority of the victims' families arranged private settlements withJAL
for various amounts of compensation based upon the victim's age, salary, and family
responsibilities. Id.
166. See Robert Rice, Crash Liability Question Still Up in the Air, FIN. TIMES, Nov. 29,
1996, at 3 (predicting that popularity ofJapanese Initiative would force other air carri-
ers to follow suit); Peter Martin & Trevor French, Blown Cover: Japanese Airlines Have
Unilaterally Opted for Unlimited Passenger Liability, AIRLINE Bus., Feb. 1993, at 44 (antici-
pating popularity of Japanese Initiative); Yumiko Ono & Bridget O'Brian, Japan's Air-
lines Waive Limits for Accidents; Move on Victim Payments May Help Bring About Simpler Global
System, WALL ST. J., Nov. 23, 1992, at All (discussing likelihood that other countries
would follow Japanese Initiative).
167. See Robert Rice, Business and the Law: Airlines Opt to Fly on a Wing and a Prayer -
Compensation Leaves Travellers Cold, FIN. TIMES, Nov. 23, 1993, at 16 [hereinafter Compen-
sation Leaves Travelers Cold] (discussing advantages of Japanese Initiative); Japan's Carri-
ers Announce They'll Scrap Treaty's Liability Limits, AIR SAFETY WK., Dec. 7, 1992, available
in WESTLAw, Airsafw Database [hereinafter Japan's Carriers] (discussing settlement
possibilities after Japanese Initiative).
168. See Compensation Leaves Travelers Cold, supra note 167, at 16.
169. See GOLDHIRSCH, supra note 26, at 97 (describingjudicial discontent with War-
saw Convention liability limits).
170. See id. at 56 (reviewing judicial debate over Warsaw Convention's cause of
action).
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was on board, embarking, or disembarking from an aircraft.
171
Court procedure has fluctuated for the adjudication of a legal
claim depending upon a passenger's choice of jurisdiction for
filing a suit under the limitations of Article 28.172 Judicial inter-
pretations of willful misconduct have varied under Article 25,
leading to a lack of uniformity in the results of such cases.' 71
1. Cause of Action
Article 17 of the Warsaw Convention provides for a cause of
action against an air carrier for death or bodily injury caused
during embarkation or disembarkation or while a passenger is
on board an aircraft.17 ' Despite this provision, early decisions by
U.S. courts interpreted the Warsaw Convention as requiring an
independent basis for a cause of action.17  Accordingly, U.S.
plaintiffs had to base their causes of action on domestic law
rather than on the Warsaw Convention itself."16
In Benjamins v. British European Airways, 77 the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit overturned earlier Second Cir-
cuit decisions that had held that the Warsaw Convention does
171. Warsaw Convention, supra note 3, art. 17, 49 Stat. 3018, 137 L.N.T.S. at 23.
172. See GOLDHIRSCH, supra note 26, (discussing judicial effect of jurisdiction
under Article 28).
173. See 1 KREINDLER, supra note 1, § 10.05[4], at 10-77 (describing effect of diffi-
culty in translating term dol in Article 25).
174. Warsaw Convention, supra note 3, art. 17., 49 Stat. at 3018, 137 L.N.T.S. at 23.
175. See GOLDHIRSCH, supra note 26, at 56 (discussing Warsaw Convention's cause
of action) In countries like the United States, a federation of states with a state and
federal court structure, the kind of action upon which a lawsuit is grounded sometimes
determines the jurisdiction of the court. Id. The cause of action may also decide who
can assert a legal claim, who can recover and the possible damages. Id.
176. See Noel v. Linea Aeropostal Venezolana, 247 F.2d 677, 679-80 (2d. Cir.), cert.
denied, 355 U.S. 907 (1957) (holding that Warsaw Convention does not create its own
independent cause of action); Komlos v. Compagnie Nationale Air France, 111 F. Supp.
393, 401 (S.D.N.Y. 1952), rev'd on other grounds, 209 F.2d 436 (2d Cir. 1953), cert. denied,
348 U.S. 820 (1954) (holding that Warsaw Convention does not create its own in-
dependent cause of action). In common law countries, such as the United Kingdom,
Canada, and Australia, legislation implementing the Warsaw Convention eradicated
most such problems. See DIEDEMRS-VERSCHOOR, supra note 9, at 67 (discussing Warsaw
Convention cause of action). In the United States, where there is no statutory imple-
mentation of the Warsaw Convention, courts had to interpret the Warsaw Convention
itself to determine whether it established a cause of action. Id. The question did not
arise in civil law countries where a cause of action could be based either on contract or
tort law. Id.
177. 572 F.2d 913 (2d Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1114 (1979).
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not create an independent cause of action. 171 In Benjamins, a
Dutch citizen permanently residing in California appealed the
dismissal of a wrongful death suit which he had brought against
British European Airways ("BEA") when the BEA aircraft on
which his wife, also a Dutch citizen permanently residing in Cali-
fornia, was a passenger crashed in England.179 The Eastern Dis-
trict Court of New York had dismissed the suit for lack of federal
jurisdiction based upon the earlier Second Circuit precedent
that the Warsaw Convention only conditions and limits causes of
action founded on other principles of domestic law.'8 0 The Ben-
jamins court stressed the Warsaw Convention's goal of creating a
uniform system for handling legal claims associated with interna-
tional aviation. 1 ' The court further noted that courts in other
countries party to the Warsaw Convention, such as the United
Kingdom, had held that the Warsaw Convention created its own
independent cause of action. 182
Benjamins resolved the debate over whether the Warsaw
Convention established its own independent cause of action.'83
The Benjamins court did not decide the issue of whether a War-
saw Convention cause of action can exist concurrently with state
law-based claims or whether that cause of action is exclusive. 84
The difficulty that U.S. courts have faced concerning exclusivity
results from the Warsaw Convention's failure to address the is-
sue. 85 Furthermore, to date, the U.S. Supreme Court has not
ruled on whether the Warsaw Convention provides an exclusive
cause of action. 86
178. Id. at 916-17 (discussing Komlos and Noel).
179. Id. at 914-15.
180. Id. at 915.
181. Id. at 917. By consulting the minutes of the two conferences which led to the
drafting of the Warsaw Convention, the court discovered that "[w]hat is made quite
clear is the extent to which the delegates were concerned with creating a uniform law to
govern air crashes, with absolutely no reference to any national law (except for the
questions of standing to sue for wrongful death, effects of contributory negligence and
procedural matters ... )." Id.
182. Id. at 918-19.
183. See Luis F. Ras, Warsaw's Wingspan over State Laws: Toward a Streamlined System
of Recovery, 59 J. AIR L. & Com. 587, 591-92 (1994) (discussing exclusivity of Warsaw
Convention's cause of action provision).
184. Id.
185. See In reAir Disaster at Lockerbie, Scotland on Dec. 21, 1988 (Lockerbie 1), 928
F.2d 1267, 1273 (2nd Cir.), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 920 (1991) (noting that Warsaw Con-
vention does not address issue of exclusivity).
186. See Eastern Airlines, Inc. v. Floyd, 499 U.S. 530, 553 (1991) (declining to
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Federal courts in the United States have issued conflicting
decisions regarding the exclusivity of the Warsaw Convention
cause of action.'1 7 In In re Air Disaster at Lockerbie, Scotland on Dec.
21, 198888 ("Lockerbie I), a U.S. appeals court held that a War-
saw Convention cause of action is exclusive.18 9 The Lockerbie I
court based its decision on several factors, including the drafters'
emphasis on uniformity in international aviation law and the
need for a common rule on questions such as the recoverability
of punitive damages.' 90
In In re Mexico City Aircrash of October 31, 1979,9' the Ninth
Circuit concluded that the language of Article 24(1) 192 supports
the position that the Warsaw Convention's drafters did not in-
tend a Warsaw Convention cause of action to be exclusive. 93 Ac-
cording to the Mexico City court, the drafters did not want state
causes of action to result in the award of varying measures of
damages to claimants in different states.1 94 The delegates used
Article 24(1) to ensure that courts would apply the Warsaw Con-
vention's liability limits consistently, regardless of the forum
where the case was heard.
1 95
2. Elements of a Claim
The Warsaw Convention will not limit recovery of damages
if a court decides that a passenger's injuries are not attributable
to an accident which took place while the passenger was on
decide question of exclusivity because lower court never addressed exclusivity issue);
Air France v. Saks, 470 U.S. 392, 408 (1985) (declining to decide question of exclusivity
because plaintiff had not clearly raised exclusivity issue before the lower court).
187. See Boehringer Manheim-Diagnostics, Inc. v. Pan Am World Airways, 737 F.2d
456, 458 (5th Cir. 1984) (holding that Warsaw Convention cause of action is exclusive),
appeal dismissed and cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1186 (1985); In re Mexico City Air Crash of
October 31, 1979, 708 F.2d 400, 418 (9th Cir. 1983) (holding that Warsaw Convention
cause of action is not exclusive).
188. 928 F.2d 1267 (2d Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 920 (1991).
189. Id. at 1273-74.
190. Id. at 1274.
191. 708 F.2d 400 (9th Cir. 1983).
192. Warsaw Convention, supra note 3, art. 24(1), 49 Stat. 3020, 137 L.N.T.S. at 27.
Article 24(1) states that "[i]n the cases covered by articles 18 and 19 any action for
damages, however founded, can only be brought subject to the conditions and limits set
out in this convention." Id. at 3020, 137 L.N.T.S. at 27 (emphasis added).
193. 708 F.2d at 414 n.25.
194. Id.
195. Id.
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board, embarking, or disembarking from an aircraft. 196 Recov-
ery of damages depends, in part, upon status as a passenger.
19 7
Some courts scrutinize a passenger's activities, his location rela-
tive to the aircraft, and the extent to which an air carrier had
control over his movements to decide whether a passenger is em-
barking or disembarking at the time of an accident.198 The goal
of the notice provisions of the Warsaw Convention is to allow a
passenger sufficient time to make an informed decision about
the purchase of additional flight insurance. 199
a. Definition of an Accident
If a passenger's injury or death is not the result of an acci-
dent that occurs on board or while embarking or disembarking
from the aircraft, the passenger may escape the liability limita-
tions of Article 17 by proving negligence.2 0 0 The U.S. Supreme
Court has held that an accident occurs only when external, un-
expected events injure or kill a passenger.20 1 To hold an air car-
rier liable, an accident must be the proximate cause20 2 of a pas-
senger's injury.2 03 U.S. courts have found that accidents occur-
ring either on board an aircraft, or at the time of embarkation or
196. Warsaw Convention, supra note 3, art. 17, 49 Stat. 3018, 137 L.N.T.S. at 23.
197. Id.
198. Day v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 528 F.2d 31 (2d Cir. 1975, cert. denied, 429
U.S. 890 (1976).
199. See I KREINDLER, supra note 1, § 10.05[1], at 10-66 (explaining rationale be-
hind Warsaw Convention's Article 3).
200. Warsaw Convention, supra note 3, art. 17, 49 Stat. 3018, 137 L.N.T.S. at 23; see
Eloise Cotugno, Comment, No Rescue in Sight for Warsaw Plaintiffs From Either Courts or
Legislature-Montreal Protocol 3 Drowns in Committee, 58J. AIR. L. & COM. 745, 762 (1993)
(discussing elements of Warsaw Convention claims).
201. See Saks, 470 U.S. at 405-06 (1985) (finding that plaintiffs deafness due to
normal aircraft pressurization was not accident); see also Walker v. Eastern Air Lines,
Inc., 775 F. Supp. 111, 115-16 (S.D.N.Y. 1991) (holding that passenger's death from
natural causes was not accident), reargument denied, 785 F. Supp. 1168 (S.D.N.Y. 1992);
Margrave v. British Airways, Inc., 643 F. Supp. 510, 511 (S.D.N.Y. 1986) (holding that
passenger's back injury due to sitting aboard airplane during extended delay was not
accident).
202. See PROSSER, supra note 13, § 42, at 278 (explaining doctrine of proximate
cause). In tort law, proximate cause generally means an act or an omission which
played a substantial part in causing an injury and, but for a particular event the injury
would not have occurred. Id.
203. Margrave, 643 F. Supp. at 512-13. Due to a bomb threat, a delay in the depar-
ture of a British Airways flight forced a passenger to remain seated for many hours,
during which period the passenger suffered continual back pain. Id. at 513. Subse-
quently, doctors discovered that the passenger suffered from vertebral fractures which
her prolonged sitting aboard the aircraft may or may not have caused. Id.
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disembarkation, have satisfied the provisions of Article 17204 in
the context of terrorist attacks, 20 hijackings,20 6 and bomb
threats.20 7
In Curley v. American Airlines, Inc.,208 a passenger sued for
negligence and false imprisonment after Mexican customs au-
thorities detained and searched him when the flight captain re-
ported that the passenger had been smoking marijuana in the
airplane's lavatory.209 The defendant air carrier moved for sum-
mary judgment,210 arguing that the Warsaw Convention pre-
empted the plaintiff's state court complaint. 2" The Curley court
held that, under Article 17, the accident must happen during
the course of normal services.2 12 The Curley court found the
Warsaw Convention inapplicable to the incident because being
wrongly accused of smoking marijuana in an aircraft lavatory was
unrelated to the normal services which a passenger could expect
during a flight's operation, embarkation, or disembarkation. 215
Similar to the Curley court, in Pittman v. Grayson,214 a U.S.
district court held that the Warsaw Convention did not apply
when the father of a minor child sued an air carrier, Icelandair,
Inc., for false imprisonment and intentional interference with
custodial rights. 21 '5 The child's father based the suit on the air
carrier's alleged role in the smuggling by the plaintiff's es-
tranged wife of the plaintiff's daughter out of the United
204. See 1 KREINDLER, supra note 1, § 10.04[2a], at 10-41 (discussing meaning of
accident in Article 17).
205. See Day, 528 F.2d 31 (2d Cir. 1975), cen. denied, 429 U.S. 890 (1976) (involving
terrorist attack); Evangelinos v. Trans World Airlines, Inc. 550 F.2d 152 (3d Cir. 1977)
(involving terrorist attack).
206. See Krystal v. British Overseas Airways Corp., 403 F. Supp. 1322 (C.D. Cal.
1975) (involving hijacking); Husserl v. Swiss Air Transport Co., 351 F. Supp. 702
(S.D.N.Y. 1972), affd, 485 F.2d 1240 (2d Cir. 1973) (involving hijacking).
207. See Salerno v. Pan Am. World Airways, 606 F. Supp. 656 (S.D.N.Y. 1985) (in-
volving bomb threat).
208. 846 F. Supp. 280 (S.D.N.Y. 1994).
209. Id. at 281.
210. See BLACK, supra note 54, at 1435 (defining summary judgment as procedural
mechanism available for timely disposition of controversy without trial when no conflict
as to material facts of controversy exists or when only question of law is present).
211. 846 F. Supp. at 281.
212. Id. at 283.
213. Id.
214. 869 F. Supp. 1065 (S.D.N.Y. 1994).
215. Id. at 1071.
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States. 6 The Pittman court found the possibility that aircraft
personnel would violate a court order by smuggling a minor
child on board the aircraft unrelated to normal expected activi-
ties during air travel.21 7
b. Definition of a Passenger
Status as a passenger on the defendant air carrier is a pre-
requisite to recovery under the Warsaw Convention.2 18  Article
1 (1) requires that a passenger must be a person who has either
paid for his transportation on the aircraft or is transported gratu-
itously.219 In Adamsons v. American Airlines, Inc. ,220 a passenger
attempting to fly from Haiti to New York for medical care filed
suit after an air carrier refused to grant her passage on the flight
because of her medical state. 22 1 Due to a forty-eight hour delay
before the passenger could leave on another flight, her medical
condition deteriorated significantly. 222 The defendant air car-
rier argued that the Warsaw Convention's liability limits should
apply to limit its liability. 223 The Adamsons court. disagreed, find-
ing that the Warsaw Convention did not apply because the air
carrier, by refusing to allow the passenger onto the aircraft, had
never accepted her as a passenger.224
Not every individual injured in an accident on board an air-
craft is deemed a passenger under Article 17 of the Warsaw Con-
vention.225 In Sulewski v. Federal Express Corporation, 6 the U.S.
216. Id. at 1067.
217. Id. at 1071.
218. Warsaw Convention, supra note 3, art. 17, 49 Stat. at 3018, 137 L.N.T.S. at 23.
219. Id. art. 1(1), 49 Stat. at 3014, 137 L.N.T.S. at 15. Article 1(1) states that the
Warsaw Convention "shall apply to all international transportation of persons, baggage,
or goods performed by aircraft for hire. It shall apply equally to gratuitous transporta-
tion by aircraft performed by an air transportation enterprise." Id. at 3014, 137
L.N.T.S. at 15; see Cotugno, supra note 200, at 764 (discussing status of passenger re-
quirement under Article 17 of Warsaw Convention).
220. 433 N.Y.S.2d 366 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1980), aff'd, 449 N.Y.S.2d 487 (N.Y. App. Div.
1st Dep't), rev'd on other grounds, 457 N.Y.S.2d 771 (N.Y. 1982), cert. denied, 463 U.S. 1209
(1983).
221. Id. at 368. The passenger was suffering from a progressive paralysis of her
lower extremities which puzzled the local doctors. Id.
222. Id. The passenger was almost totally paralyzed by the time she arrived at Co-
lumbia Presbyterian Hospital in New York. Id.
223. Id.
224. Id. at 369.
225. See GouIRscH, supra note 26, at 57 (discussing passenger-status require-
ment of Article 17).
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Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit considered the issue of
whether an air carrier's own employee is a passenger for Warsaw
Convention purposes.2 27  In Sulewski, the wife of an airline
mechanic filed suit when the cargo plane on which her husband
was traveling crashed in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia.2 18 The Sulew-
ski court found that the mechanic's mere presence on board the
cargo plane was insufficient to satisfy the Warsaw Convention's
passenger-status requirement. 229 According to the Sulewski
court, the Warsaw Convention only applies to people on board,
boarding, or disembarking as a result of a contract of carriage
with the air carrier for travel purposes.211
c. Embarkation, Disembarkation, and Events On Board
In Day v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 31 the U.S. Court of Ap-
peals for the Second Circuit devised a three-part test to ascertain
whether passengers are embarking or disembarking when an ac-
cident occurs.2 32 The three-part test considers the passenger's
activities,2  the distance between the passenger and the air-
craft, 2 34 and the amount of control the air carrier had over the
passenger at the time of the accident.235 In Day, the passengers
had already gone through passport control and were lining up
for the requisite hand luggage search prior to boarding a plane
at the Athens, Greece airport when terrorists attacked the air-
226. 933 F.2d 180 (2d Cir. 1991).
227. Id. at 182-83.
228. Id. at 181.
229. Id. at 184. The court stated that "[c]arrier liability for the injuries or deaths
of 'passengers'... requires something more than the person's presence aboard the
carrier." Id.
230. Id. According to the Sulewski court, carrier liability "requires, first, that the
person board the carrier pursuant to a contract of carriage and, second, that the car-
riage be undertaken for the primary purpose either of going from one place to another
or for the recreational enjoyment of the journey itself." Id.; see Mexico City Air Crash, 708
F.2d 400, 417-18 (9th Cir. 1983) (holding that personnel working on board aircraft as
flight attendants are not passengers, thereby precluding them from recovery under
Warsaw Convention).
231. 528 F.2d 31 (2d Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 890 (1976).
232. Id. at 33-34.
233. Id. In Day, the court considered whether the passengers' actions were part of
the embarkation process. Id. at 33.
234. Id. At the time of the terrorist attack, the Day passengers were standing in
line adjacent to the passenger gate. Id.
235. Id. The Day passengers were not at liberty to roam at will throughout the
terminal. Id. The air carrier's agents compelled them to stand in line for the purpose
of undergoing a weapons inspection as a requirement of boarding. Id.
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port, injuring several passengers. 23 '6 The Day court held that the
Warsaw Convention applied because the passengers were follow-
ing crucial steps involved in embarking onto the aircraft and
were not free to wander at will through the terminal.2 37
The phrase on board has generated little litigation in the
context of Article 17.238 In Herman v. Trans World Airlines, Inc.,239
a fourteen year-old child suffered physical injuries while hijack-
ers held the child hostage on the aircraft in flight and also for a
week on the ground in the desert outside Amman, Jordan.24
The Herman court held that the Warsaw Convention applied to
limit the air carrier's liability because the hijackers prevented the
child from disembarking the aircraft by continuing to hold her
on board during the incident.24' In the Herman court's view, be-
cause the child had not disembarked during the hijacking, she
was still on board the aircraft.242
Similarly, a U.S. district court had to determine the issue of
passenger status on board an aircraft in Husserl v. Swiss Air Trans-
port Co., Ltd.2 43 In Husserl, an Arab terrorist group hijacked an
aircraft-after takeoff from Zurich, Switzerland and instructed the
pilot to land in a desert area near Amman, Jordan.2"4  After
holding the passengers on board the aircraft for twenty-four
hours under less than ideal conditions, the hijackers moved the
passengers to a hotel in Amman where the passengers remained
236. Id. at 32. Three people died and more than 40 others suffered injuries when
two Palestinian terrorists tossed three grenades and released a salvo of small-arms fire
into a line of passengers waiting to board TWA Flight 881 to New York. Id.
237. Id. at 33-34. Other courts have applied the Day test in determining whether
passengers are in the process of embarkation or disembarkation. See, e.g., McCarthy v.
Northwest Airlines, Inc., 56 F.3d 313, 317-18 (1st Cir. 1995) (applying Day test and
determining that passenger was not embarking when she fell on escalator in airport's
common area); Buonocore v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 900 F.2d 8, 10-11 (2d Cir.
1990) (applying Day test and determining that passenger was in airport's public area
and not embarking when terrorist attack occurred); Martinez Hernandez v. Air France,
545 F.2d 279, 282-83 (1st Cir. 1976) (applying Day test and determining that passengers
who had left aircraft, gone through immigration, and were in airport's main baggage
area had completed disembarking when terrorist attack occurred), cert. denied, 430 U.S.
950 (1977).
238. See 1 SPEISER & KRAUSE, supra note 2, § 11:33, at 733 (noting that cases con-
testing meaning of passenger presence on board aircraft have been rare).
239. 330 N.Y.S.2d 829 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1972).
240. Id.
241. Id. at 832-33.
242. Id. at 833.
243. 388 F. Supp. 1238 (S.D.N.Y. 1975).
244. Id. at 1242.
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for several days before being flown to Nicosia, Cyprus and even-
tually to New York, their original destination. 245  The Husserl
court held that injuries claimed by hijacked passengers for their
time on board the aircraft as well as for the period in the hotel
in Amman, Jordan were within the scope of Article 17 because
the passengers had embarked in Zurich, Switzerland and had
not yet disembarked in New York.2 ,
d. Notice
Under Article 3, an air carrier that accepts a passenger with-
out providing the passenger with an appropriately worded ticket
forfeits the limited liability protection of the Warsaw Conven-
tion. 247 U.S. courts have interpreted this provision to mean that
an air carrier must deliver a ticket to a passenger before air
travel begins so that the passenger may make an informed deci-
sion about purchasing additional flight insurance.248 In Mertens
v. Flying Tiger, Inc.,249 the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit observed that it would be illogical to allow ticket delivery
to take place after a plane had taken off, when a passenger could
no longer purchase additional flight insurance or reconsider his
or her decision to fly.250 In Manion v. Pan Am. World Airways,
Inc.,251 the New York Court of Appeals held that delivery of a
ticket for the second leg of a trip was inadequate under Article
245. Id.
246. Id. at 1247-48. The Husserl court reasoned that the Warsaw Convention's
drafters "undoubtedly assumed that the time 'on board the aircraft' included all of the
time between embarkation at the origin of a flight and disembarkation at a scheduled
destination of a flight." Id. at 1247.
247. Warsaw Convention, supra note 3, art. 3(2), 49 Stat. at 3015, 137 L.N.T.S. at
17.
248. Compare Warren v. Flying Tiger Line, Inc., 352 F.2d 494, 498 (9th Cir. 1965)
(holding that ticket delivery at foot of ramp just prior to boarding aircraft deprived
passengers of opportunity to read ticket or purchase additional insurance before board-
ing) with Domangue v. Eastern Air Lines, Inc., 531 F. Supp. 334, 339 (E.D. La. 1981)
(holding that passenger had enough time to protect himself where ticket delivery oc-
curred at ticket counter). The reason for this provision is to give the passenger time to
read the ticket and to understand the impact of its limited liability notice for purposes
of deciding whether to purchase additional insurance. See 1 KREINDLER, supra note 1,
§ 10.05[l], at 10-66 (discussing reasoning behind Article 3 ticketing requirement).
249. 341 F.2d 851 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 816 (1965).
250. Id. at 856-57. The Mertens court noted that "the delivery requirement of Arti-
cle 3(2) would make little sense if it could be satisfied by delivering the ticket to the
passenger when the aircraft was several thousand feet in the air." Id. at 857.
251. 449 N.Y.S.2d 693 (N.Y. 1982).
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3.152 In Manion, a passenger was traveling from New York to
Saudi Arabia, with an initial stop in Rome, Italy where terrorists
injured her in a firebomb attack."' Although the air carrier
eventually delivered a ticket to the passenger in Rome, the Ma-
nion court held that the air carrier's failure to deliver a ticket to
the passenger upon the passenger's embarkation in New York
rendered the Warsaw Convention's liability limits inapplica-
ble. 2 54
Under the Montreal Agreement, air carriers must notify pas-
sengers of the Warsaw Convention's liability limits in writing in
print size no smaller than ten-point type at the time of ticket
purchase. 255  In 1965, in Lisi v. Alitalia-Linee Aeree Italiane,
S.p.A.,256 an air carrier used very small print to indicate the no-
tice provisions concerning the Warsaw Convention's liability lim-
its on passengers' tickets. 257 The Lisi court held that the air car-
rier could not benefit from the Warsaw Convention's liability
limits where notice of those limits appeared in a type-size that
was too small for passengers to read easily.258
Not until 1989, in Chan v. Korean Air Lines, Ltd.,259 did the
U.S. Supreme Court hold that failure to provide notice in ten-
point type did not invalidate the limited liability provisions of
the Warsaw Convention. 6 ° Justice Scalia's majority opinion
found that Article 3 of the Warsaw Convention requires only
timely delivery of the ticket to the passenger.2  Accordingly, an
irregularity in the ticket, such as the use of eight-point type
rather than ten-point type, did not negate its delivery.262 In his
concurrence, Justice Brennan asserted that the Montreal Agree-
252. Id. at 694.
253. Id.
254. Id.
255. Montreal Interim Agreement, supra note 82. See 1 KREINDLER, supra note 1,
§ 12.03, at 12-08 (discussing ticket requirements).
256. 370 F.2d 508 (2d Cir. 1966), aff'd, 390 U.S. 455 (1968).
257. Id. at 513-14. The Lisi court agreed with the lower court's descriptions of the
notice provisions as "camouflaged in Lilliputian print . . . ineffectively positioned,
diminutively sized, and unemphasized by bold face type, contrasting color, or anything
else. The simple truth is that they are so artfully camouflaged that their presence is
concealed." Id. at 514.
258. Id. at 514.
259. 490 U.S. 122 (1 989).
260. Id. at 128.
261. Id. at 128-29.
262. Id.
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ment's type-size requirement could not amend the Warsaw Con-
vention because the Montreal Agreement was a private agree-
ment among airline companies, not a formal amendment to the
Warsaw Convention.263
3. Jurisdiction
Under Article 28 of the Warsaw Convention, the appropri-
ate fora for filing suit include an air carrier's domicile, an air
carrier's principal place of business, the place of business where
an air carrier made the air travel contract with a passenger, or
the location of a passenger's destination.2 64 The four fora listed
in Article 28 refer to a contracting party's entire territory, not
solely to one of its national subdivisions, such as one specific
state.265 If a claimant cannot bring suit in one of the four fora,
jurisdiction does not exist and the court must dismiss the
claim.266 By limiting the number of fora, the drafters sought to
prevent plaintiffs from filing suit in locations that would be in-
convenient for an air carrier.267
When applying the Article 28 criteria, U.S. courts have
found that an air carrier's domicile is its place of incorpora-
263. Id. at 150.
264. Warsaw Convention, supra note 3, art. 28(1), 49 Stat. at 3020, 137 L.N.T.S. at
27-29.
265. See Mertens v. Flying Tiger Line, Inc., 341 F.2d 851, 855 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
382 U.S. 816 (1965) (discussing geographical location of Warsaw Convention High
Contracting Parties).
266. See Swaminathan v. Swiss Air Transport Co., 962 F.2d 387, 390 (5th Cir. 1992)
(holding that air carrier's domicile in Switzerland or passenger's destination in Senegal,
and not United States, were proper fora for suit); In re Air Disaster Near Cove Neck,
New York on Jan. 25, 1990, 774 F. Supp. 718, 725 (E.D.N.Y. 1991) (holding that air
carrier's domicile in Columbia, and not United States, was proper forum for suit);
Karfunkel v. Compagnie Nationale Air France, 427 F. Supp. 971 (S.D.N.Y. 1977) (hold-
ing that air carrier's domicile in France or air carrier's place of business through which
contract was made in Israel and not United States were proper fora for suit).
267. MINUTES, supra note 35, at 114-15. At the Warsaw Conference, Mr. Orme
Clarke, the delegate representing Great Britain, Australia, and South Africa, pointed
out that:
In long trips, such as the trip from London to India, you pass by countries
where the courts are not at all organized and where you will have formidable
difficulties in bringing an action, for example, such as before the courts of
Persia or Mesopotamia. The carrier would have enormous difficulties in de-
fending a trial which could be instituted in these distant countries, where the
courts are indeed not well organized.
Id. at 114.
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tion. 6 Courts have also determined that an air carrier may
have only one principal place of business.269 Although an air
carrier can have only one principal place of business under Arti-
cle 28, it may be difficult to determine which of the air carrier's
places of business is its principal one, for example, when the car-
rier has its executive offices at one location, the majority of its
employees or aircraft at another location, and its busiest ticket
office at yet another location.270
For purposes of the third forum, the place of business
where an air carrier made the air travel contract with a passen-
ger, the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit dealt with the
issue of whether air carriers who conduct their ticketing business
through interline agreements with other air carriers, or through
agreements with independent travel agencies, consequently have
a place of business in the United States.271 In Eck v. United Arab
272 emeoAirlines, Inc., a member of a ski group that flew from Los An-
geles to Europe on a charter flight operated by Scandinavian Air-
lines System ("SAS") planned to take a side trip to the Middle
East as part of her vacation.2 7 3 The passenger purchased a ticket
from an SAS agent in Oakland, California for a United Arab Air-
lines ("UAA") flight from Europe to the Middle East.274 The
SAS agent collected the ticket fare and forwarded it to the UAA
home office in Cairo. 75 Under UAA's customary business prac-
tices, the passenger could have purchased the ticket for the side
trip at UAA's offices in New York, Los Angeles, or at one of the
268. See Smith v. Canadian Pac. Airways, Ltd., 452 F.2d 798, 802 (2d Cir. 1971)
(stating that air carrier's domicile is its place of incorporation); Eck v. United Arab
Airlines, Inc., 360 F.2d 804, 809 (2d Cir. 1966) (stating that air carrier's domicile is its
place of incorporation); In re Air Disaster Near Cove Neck, New York, onJan. 25, 1990,
774 F. Supp. 718, 720 n.5 (E.D.N.Y. 1991) (stating that air carrier's domicile is its place
of incorporation).
269. See Canadian Pac. Airways, 452 F.2d at 802 n.13 (stating that an air carrier has
only one principal place of business); Eck, 360 F.2d at 809 n.9 (stating that an air carrier
has only one principal place of business); Air Disaster Near Cove Neck, 774 F. Supp. at 722
(stating that an air carrier has only one principal place of business); Nudo v. Soci6t6
Anonyme Belge D'Exploitation, 207 F. Supp. 191, 192 (E.D. Pa. 1962) (stating that air
carrier has only one principal place of business).
270. See 1 SPEISER & KRAUSE, supra note 2, § 11:42, at 797 (discussing jurisdictional
fora of Article 28).
271. Eck, 360 F.2d 804 (2d Cir. 1965).
272. Id.
273. Id. at 807.
274. Id. at 807-08.
275. Id. at 807.
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ticket counters of almost any other air carrier operating in the
United States.2 76 The passenger filed suit in the U.S. District
Court for the Southern District of New York to recover damages
for personal injuries she suffered when the UAA aircraft on
which she traveled crashed in the Sudan. 277 The district court
granted UAA's motion for dismissal of the suit on the grounds
that the district court lacked jurisdiction under Article 28.78
The Second Circuit reversed, holding that UAA had a place of
business in the United States through which the air carrier con-
tracted with the passenger because UAA had complete control
over its business decision to sell its tickets through other air car-
riers in the United States, even though UAA maintained its own
regular ticketing offices in the United States. 79
The Second Circuit distinguished the facts in the Eck case
from those in Smith v. Canadian Pacific Airways, Ltd.28 ° In Smith,
a passenger purchased a ticket in Vancouver, British Columbia
for a Canadian Pacific flight to Tokyo, Japan.28 1 In contrast to
Eck, although Canadian Pacific Airways maintained a place of
business in the United States, it did not allow other air carriers
to sell its tickets in the United States.282 Accordingly, the Smith
court held that U.S. courts lacked jurisdiction over the suit pur-
suant to Article 28 of the Warsaw Convention.28 3
The fourth enumerated forum, the location of a passenger's
destination, provides the broadest potential jurisdiction of the
four fora.2 84 Although an air carrier may have only one domicile
and one principal place of business, a passenger's destination
276. Id. at 807-08.
277. Id. at 806.
278. Id. at 807.
279. Id. at 813-14. The Second Circuit based its holding on the conclusion that
"[t]he central purpose of Article 28(1)'s third provision was to make venue always
proper in the country where the ticket was purchased-assuming it is a High Con-
tracting Party-if, but only if, the defendant has a place of business there." Id. at 814.
280. 452 F.2d 798, 802 (2d Cir. 1971).
281. Id. at 799.
282. Id. at 803.
283. Id.
284. See James D. MacIn tyre, Where Are You Going? Destination, Jurisdiction, and the
Warsaw Convention: Does Passenger Intent Enter the Analysis?, 60J. AIR L. & CoM. 657, 673
(1995) (explaining how extent of possible passenger destinations defines the range of
destination as jurisdictional forum). Article 1 defines international travel according to
the place of departure and the place of destination. Id. at n.77. Where the two places
are the same, Article 1 bases international travel upon the location of a stopping place
that is outside the territory of the place of departure and destination. Id. For the War-
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may be within the territory of any High Contracting Party to the
Warsaw Convention. 285  For jurisdictional purposes, a passen-
ger's destination is his or her last intended stop, even if the de-
fendant is not the air carrier responsible for the final leg of the
passenger's trip. 8 6
A number of cases have arisen interpreting the meaning of
final destination. 8 7 In Sopcak v. Northern Mountain Helicopter Ser-
vice,288 the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that the
parties' intention as indicated on the airline ticket determines
the passenger's final destination. 2 9 The Ninth Circuit's holding
agreed with previous holdings in the Second and Fifth cir-
cuits. 9 At least one court has held that a party may rebut the
presumption that a passenger's final destination is the one listed
on the ticket by proving the absence of mutual consent to the
final destination.29
1
saw Convention to apply, therefore, international travel requires the existence of a des-
tination. Id.
285. Warsaw Convention, supra note 3, art. 1(2), 49 Stat. at 3014, 137 L.N.T.S. at
15.
286. See In re Alleged Food Poisoning Incident v. British Airways, Inc., 770 F.2d 3,
6 (2d Cir. 1985) (finding United States had no jurisdiction over suit against British
Airways where passenger's ticket listed Saudi Arabia as final destination); 1 KREINDLER,
supra note 1, § 10.06, at 10-94 (discussing last stop as jurisdictional forum under Article
28).
287. See Sopcak v. Northern Mountain Helicopter Service, 52 F.2d 817, 819 (9th
Cir. 1995) (holding that destination shown on airline ticket indicates parties' intent and
determines destination); Swaminathan v. Swiss Air Transport Co., 962 F.2d 387, 389
(5th Cir. 1992) (finding that parties' objective intent as shown on airline ticket, and not
passenger's undisclosed subjective intent, determines destination); In re Air Crash Dis-
aster Near Warsaw, Poland, on May 9, 1987, 760 F. Supp. 30, 32 (E.D.N.Y. 1991) (find-
ing that passenger's destination is location where passenger intended to arrive and
would have arrived had airline disaster not happened); Petrire v. Spantax, SA, 756
F.2d 263, 265-66 (2d Cir. 1985) (holding that passenger's destination is determined by
reference to whether parties intended single contract of undivided transportation
where air carrier issued two ticket booklets), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 846 (1985).
288. 52 F.3d 817 (9th Cir. 1995).
289. Id. at 819.
290. See Swaminathan, 962 F.2d at 389 (parties objective intent, as shown on airline
ticket, and not passenger's subjective intent, determines destination); Petrire, 756 F.2d
at 265 (passenger's destination is determined by reference to whether parties intended
single contract of undivided transportation where air carrier issued two ticket booklets).
291. See Air Crash Disaster Near Warsaw, 760 F. Supp. at 32 (holding that destina-
tion of passenger is place where passenger intended to arrive and would have arrived
but for occurrence of airline disaster). In Air Crash Disaster Near Warsaw, two Polish
citizens who died in an air disaster incorrectly believed that a Polish law requiring Po-
lish citizens to purchase roundtrip tickets applied to them despite their status as perma-
nent U.S. permanent residents. Id. at 32. The court held that the evidence supported a
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4. Liability Provisions
An air carrier can lose the Warsaw Convention's safeguards
limiting compensatory or other types of damages if a passenger
can prove willful misconduct on the part of the air carrier. 92
The results in willful misconduct cases vary according to the law
of the court in which a passenger files a complaint against an air
carrier. 293 The Warsaw Convention's lack of specificity as to the
nature of damages collectible in air carrier disasters has led
some courts to deny punitive damage awards in situations where
other courts have granted such recoveries.294 With regard to ju-
dicial disagreement concerning air carrier liability for emotional
distress, the Supreme Court has decided that the language of
Article 17 does not contemplate such recoveries in the absence
of bodily injury.2 95
a. Compensatory Damages
Under Article 25 of the Warsaw Convention, an air carrier
or its agent will lose the benefit of the Warsaw Convention's lim-
ited liability provisions if the air carrier or its agent engaged in
willful misconduct. 296 The Warsaw Convention does not define
willful misconduct. 297 Article 25(1) allows courts to apply their
finding that the two victims intended the United States to be their ultimate destination.
Id.; see also MacIntyre, supra note 284, at 691-92 (discussing passenger intent and desti-
nation under Article 28).
292. Warsaw Convention, supra note 3, arts. 25(1), 25(2), 49 Stat. at 3020, 137
L.N.T.S. at 27.
293. See Cotugno, supra note 200, at 773 (crediting latitude inherent in Article 25's
language as cause of dissimilar results in willful misconduct cases).
294. See BarbaraJ. Buono, Note, The Recoverability of Punitive Damages Under the War-
saw Convention in Cases of Wilful Misconduct: Is the Sky the Limit?, 13 FORDHAM INT'L. L.J.
570, 582 (1990) (describing effect of Warsaw Convention's failure to define type of
damages awardable in international aviation disasters).
295. Eastern Airlines, Inc. v. Floyd, 499 U.S. 530, 552 (1991).
296. Warsaw Convention, supra note 3, arts. 25(1), 25(2), 49 Stat. at 3020, 137
L.N.T.S. at 27.
297. See 1 SPEISER & KRAUSE, supra note 2, § 11:37, at 770 (discussing term willful
misconduct in common law countries' translation of Article 25). Willful misconduct is
the translation used in common law countries for the term dol which the official French
version of the Warsaw Convention uses. Id. Under common law there is no equivalent
for the civil law concept of dol. See 1 KREINDLER, supra note 1, § 10.05[4], at 10-77
(discussing term dol in official French version of Warsaw Convention). In civil law
countries, some translators have used the term gross negligence to translate the term
dol into English. Id.
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own law in defining willful misconduct.298 The plaintiff has the
burden of proving willful misconduct, which is a question of
fact29 9 for a jury.3 °°
Different definitions of willful misconduct lead to various
results in willful misconduct cases because, under Article 25, the
definition of willful misconduct is dependent upon the law of
the court trying the case."'1 In In re Air Disaster at Lockerbie, Scot-
land Dec. 21, 198832 ("Lockerbie IT), the Second Circuit defined
willful misconduct as meaning that an air carrier took action
which it knew would probably lead to injury or death, or that an
air carrier consciously or recklessly ignored the fact that death or
injury would probably result from its actions.30 3 U.S. courts have
not typically required an intent to do harm as a requirement for
willful misconduct.30 4 A pattern of acts or omissions may pro-
vide evidence of willful misconduct, even if each single act or
omission does not prove willful misconduct when viewed in isola-
298. Warsaw Convention, supra note 3, art. 25(1), 49 Stat. at 3020, 137 L.N.T.S. at
27. Article 25(1) provides that
[t]he carrier shall not be entitled to avail himself of the provisions of this
convention which exclude or limit his liability, if the damage is caused by his
wilful misconduct or by such default on his part as, in accordance with the law of
the court to which the case is submitted, is considered to be equivalent to wilful
misconduct.
Id. at 3020, 137 L.N.T.S. at 27 (emphasis added).
299. See BLAcK, supra note 54, at 1246 (defining question of fact as concerning
resolution of factual dispute within jury's province, in contrast to question of law).
300. See 1 SPEISER & KRAUSE, supra note 2, § 11:37, at 771-72 (discussing willful
misconduct under the Article 25). In a jury trial setting, the correct procedure is to
submit the evidence to the jury along with instructions from the judge on the question
of what amounts to wilful misconduct, and allow the jury make a separate determina-
tion, by a separate verdict, as to whether or not the defendant or his agent committed
willful misconduct. Id.
301. See Cotugno, supra note 200, at 773 (attributing disparity of findings in willful
misconduct cases to ambiguity of Article 25 provision allowing law of forum court to
define meaning of willful misconduct).
302. 37 F.3d 804 (2d Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 934 (1995).
303. Id. at 812. According to the Lockerbie II court, "[w ] ilful misconduct under the
Convention means that a carrier must have acted either 1) with knowledge that its
actions would probably result in injury or death, or 2) in conscious or reckless disregard
of the fact that death or injury would be the probable consequence of its actions." Id.
304. See Pekelis v. Transcontinental & Western Air, Inc., 187 F.2d 122, 124 (2d
Cir.) (explaining that intention to do harm is not required for willful misconduct find-
ing), cert. denied, 341 U.S. 951 (1951). In Pekelis, the Second Circuit, in approving the
lower court's jury charge, stated that willful misconduct "does not mean that the de-
fendant, or any of its employees, had a deliberate intention to kill [the passenger] or to
wreck this airplane." Id. at 124; 1 KREINDLER, supra note 1, § 10.05[4], at 10-80 (discuss-
ing lack of requirement to do harm as element of willful misconduct).
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5
U.S. Courts have found willful misconduct in a variety of
circumstances.3 0 6 In Ospina v. Trans World Airlines, Inc. ,307 the
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reversed a lower court's
finding of willful misconduct in a case involving a bomb explo-
sion on an aircraft which was landing in Athens, Greece.3 0 8 The
Ospina court found an absence of willful misconduct because the
air carrier had followed standard federal aviation procedures
and local laws. 0 9
In 1991, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Colum-
bia Circuit affirmed a lower court finding of willful misconduct
in a case involving a Korean Air lines ("KAL") aircraft which
flew off course into Soviet airspace. 10 A Soviet Union SU-15 in-
terceptor aircraft shot down the KAL aircraft over the Sea of Ja-
pan.3'1  The court found that the plaintiffs properly presented
evidence of previous KAL errors in programming flight paths.3 12
The evidence also suggested that the flight crew decided to con-
tinue their flight rather than risk disciplinary action by returning
to Anchorage, Alaska, the flight's last refueling stop.313
In Lockerbie II, a Pan American World Airways aircraft ex-
ploded over Lockerbie, Scotland due to a bomb hidden inside a
radio-cassette player packed in a suitcase.314 At the time, the risk
of a bomb, hidden inside a radio packed in interline baggage,
305. See Lockerbie II, 37 F.3d at 824 (holding "willful misconduct causing an acci-
dent may be established by inference from .. .totality of the circumstances"); In re
Korean Air Lines Disaster of Sept. 1, 1983, 932 F.2d 1475, 1481 (D.C. Cir.)(finding that
sufficient evidence existed "from which to decipher a pattern of conduct giving rise to
liability"), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 994 (1991); 1 KREINDLER, supra note 1, § 10.05[4), at 10-
85 (discussing fact pattern giving rise to willful misconduct findings).
306. See 1 KREINDLER, supra note 1, § 10.05[4], at 10-82 (noting variety of different
circumstances under which plaintiffs have proven willful misconduct).
307. 975 F.2d 35 (2d Cir. 1992), ceit. denied, 507 U.S. 1051 (1993).
308. Id. at 37. In finding that the air carrier had complied with governmental
aviation procedures, the Second Circuit noted that "if TWA had searched the place
where the bomb was hidden, the bomb would have been discovered. That would be
true in any case involving a hidden bomb. However, the test for willful misconduct is
not 20-20 hindsight." Id.
309. Id.
310. In re Korean Air Lines Disaster of Sept. 1, 1983, 932 F.2d 1475, 1490 (D.C.
Cir.), cert denied, 502 U.S. 994 (1991).
311. Id. at 1476.
312. Id. at 1483-84.
313. Id. at 1483.
314. 37 F.3d at 811.
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was well known to the aviation industry. 15 The Lockerbie II court
found that the plaintiffs had produced enough evidence to indi-
cate that the air carrier's personnel repeatedly ignored warnings
indicating that its security measures were deficient.
316
b. Punitive Damages
The Warsaw Convention and the Montreal Agreement do
not'specify the type of damages courts may award to plaintiffs.
3 17
Hill v. United Airlines318 was the first U.S. case to discuss the possi-
bility of awarding punitive damages under the Warsaw Conven-
tion."1 9 In Hill, passengers sued an air carrier for the tort of in-
tentional misrepresentation when the air carrier allegedly mis-
represented that authorities had closed the connecting airport
to which the passengers were flying due to inclement weather.
3 20
When the passengers finally arrived at the connecting airport,
the air carrier's agent informed them that a lack of equipment
had prevented the air carrier from taking the passengers to the
connecting airport.3 21 The passengers claimed that, had the air
carrier told the passengers the truth, they could have made their
connection by taking a different air carrier to the connecting
airport.322 The passengers maintained that, as a consequence of
missing their connecting flight, a vital business deal was delayed
for one month.2 3 The Hill court indicated that proof of the
alleged intentional misrepresentation would constitute willful
misconduct on the part of the air carrier under the Warsaw Con-
vention, which would warrant the award of both compensatory
and punitive damages 3 24
315. Id. at 819. In 1985, an Air India aircraft exploded over the North Atlantic due
to a bomb hidden inside a radio and packed in an unaccompanied interline bag, killing
all persons on board. Id. Consequently, in 1986, the FAA adopted heightened safety
regulations requiring air carriers to physically inspect any unaccompanied luggage
before loading. Id, at 813.
316. Id. at 819.
317. Cotugno, supra note 200, at 777.
318. 550 F. Supp. 1048 (D. Kan. 1982).
319. Id at 1055-56; see Buono, supra note 294, at 593 (discussing punitive damage
recovery under Warsaw Convention).
320. 550 F. Supp. at 1050.
321. Id.
322. Id.
323. Id. at 1050-51.
324. Id. at 1055-56. The Hill court found that although "the Warsaw Convention is
basically the controlling law in this case, plaintiffs have properly invoked the provisions
18091997]
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U.S. courts have divided over whether to award punitive
damages in cases of willful misconduct.125 InJanuary 1990, in In
re Hijacking of Pan American World Airways, Inc. Aircraft at Karachi
International Airport, Pakistan on Sept. 5, 1986,326 a U.S. district
court held that the Warsaw Convention does not bar recovery of
punitive damages for willful misconduct.3 27 In contrast, that
same month, another U.S. district court held that the Warsaw
Convention does prohibit punitive damages, regardless of willful
misconduct. 328 The following year, when it affirmed the deci-
sion in the latter case, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit disagreed with the Karachi court's decision allowing puni-
tive damages for willful misconduct. 29  The Second Circuit
based its finding on the meaning of the phrase dommage survenu
in the original French text of Article 17.330 Determining that the
appropriate translation of dommage survenu was damages sus-
tained,3 l the Second Circuit concluded that Article 17 envisions
only monetary or compensatory damages. 33 2 From its review of
the drafting history of the Warsaw Convention and the drafters'
failure to mention punitive damages, the Second Circuit de-
duced that punitive damages did not constitute the intended
form of recovery.333 The Second Circuit found that awarding
of Article 25(1), which make an exception to defendant's limited liability and might
entitle plaintiffs to recover actual and punitive damages ... if they prove the elements
of intentional misrepresentation." Id. at 1056.
325. Buono, supra note 294, at 582.
326. 729 F. Supp. 17 (S.D.N.Y. 1990), rev'd, 928 F.2d 1267 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
112 S. Ct. 331 (1991).
327. Id. at 19-20. The Karachi court found that "[plunitive damages are a part of
common law tort remedies.., and no language in the Convention expressly preempts
or precludes such claims, although consistent with Article 22, all damages, including
punitive damages, cannot exceed $75,000." Id. at 19.
328. In re Air Disaster in Lockerbie, Scotland on December 21, 1988, 733 F. Supp.
at 549-50. The Lockerbie court stated that "[since the application of local law to puni-
tive damage claims would be inconsistent with the primary goal of the Warsaw Conven-
tion, this Court may not find that the treaty's mere silence authorized punitive damage
claims to be governed by local law." Id. at 550.
329. Lockerbie I, 928 F.2d at 1270, 1288.
330. Id. at 1281.
331. Id.
332. Id. The court was "convince[d] that the proper translation is 'damage sus-
tained' and deduce[d] therefore that Article 17 contemplate[d] monetary damages
only." Id.
333. Id. at 1284. The court concluded that "[n]othing in this drafting history sug-
gests that the drafters ever considered that they might be allowing a contracting party to
impose punitive damages." Id.
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punitive damages would undermine the drafters' goals by
preventing uniformity, limiting insurability of the aviation indus-
try, and promoting increased litigation." 4
c. Damages for Emotional Distress
Article 17 of the Warsaw Convention refers to the death or
bodily injury of a passenger in the event of an accident on board
an aircraft or while embarking or disembarking. 3 5 U.S. courts
initially disagreed as to whether the Warsaw Convention in-
cluded liability for emotional distress in the absence of physical
injury. 3 6 In Rosman v. Trans World Airlines, 37 the New York State
Court of Appeals held that Article 17 did not provide for recov-
ery for emotional distress without the concurrent presence of
physical injury. 338 The Rosman court based its holding on its
analysis of the phrase bodily injury used in Article 17.339 In com-
parison, in Husserl,34 ° the U. S. District Court for the Southern
District of New York found that the drafters of the Warsaw Con-
vention anticipated recovery for mental injuries under Article
17.341 After analyzing the intentions of the Warsaw Convention's
drafters, the Husserl court found no evidence that the drafters
334. Id. at 1287. The court concluded that:
Interpreting the Convention to allow such recovery would severely hobble
most of the aims the Convention sought to accomplish: establishing a uni-
form carrier liability regime, limiting carrier liability to ensure a viable indus-
try, ensuring the carriers' ability to insure against losses, and adequately com-
pensating injured passengers quickly and with a minimum of litigation.
Id.
335. Warsaw Convention, supra note 3, art. 17, 49 Stat. at 3018, 137 L.N.T.S. at 23.
336. See Cotugno, supra note 200, at 780 (discussing whether emotional distress
falls within scope of Warsaw Convention).
337. 34 N.Y.2d 385 (N.Y. 1974).
338. Id. at 399-400.
339. Id. The court explained that:
The claim must.., be predicated upon some objective identifiable injury to
the body. In addition, there must be some causal connection between the
bodily injury and the 'accident.' In our view, this connection can be estab-
lished whether the bodily injury was caused by physical impact, by the physical
circumstances of the confinement or by psychic trauma. If the accident ...
caused severe fright, which in turn manifested itself in some objective 'bodily
injury,' then we would conclude that the Convention's requirement of the
causal connection is satisfied.
Id.
340. 388 F. Supp. 1238 (S.D.N.Y. 1975).
341. Id. at 1250.
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intended to exclude mental injury from recovery.3 42
The U.S. Supreme Court resolved the conflict over damages
for mental injuries in Eastern Airlines, Inc. v. Floyd3 43 by reviewing
the original French text of the Warsaw Convention.3 4 The
Court found that the term lesion corporelle in Article 17 translated
into bodily injury.3 45 The Floyd court decided that the Warsaw
Convention did not provide recovery for emotional distress with-
out the presence of physical injury.5 46  The Court further con-
cluded that this construction of Article 17 supported the Warsaw
Convention's goal of creating uniformity in handling legal
claims associated with international aviation disasters. 47
II. PROPOSALS FOR LIABILITY LIMIT REFORM
The prevailing view throughout much of the world that the
Warsaw Convention's liability limits have resulted in under-com-
pensation of passengers involved in international aviation disas-
ters has led to the most recent wave of efforts to ameliorate the
situation. 48 The majority of these attempts, including the IATA
Intercarrier Agreement, the DOT's proposed additional condi-
tions to the IATA Intercarrier Agreement, and the EC Proposal,
have been concerned with raising the Warsaw Convention's lia-
bility limits by means of contractual agreements having the ad-
vantage of avoiding the lengthy ratification process involved in
342. Id. The Husserl court concluded that "[t]o effect the treaty's avowed purpose,
the types of injuries enumerated should be construed expansively to encompass as
many types of injury as are colorably within the ambit of the enumerated types. Mental
and psychosomatic injuries are colorably within that ambit and are, therefore, compre-
hended by Article 17." Id.
343. 499 U.S. 530 (1991).
344. Id. at 535.
345. Id. at 536-37.
346. Id. at 552.
347. Id. The Floyd court noted that the legal systems of many countries require a
high degree of proof for recovery of mental distress. Id. For example, U.S. courts re-
quire evidence of extreme and outrageous conduct by the tortfeasor, British courts re-
strict recovery through the requirement of foreseeability, and French courts demand
proof of fault and confirmation that damage is direct and certain. Id. Because the
Warsaw Convention as modified by the Montreal Agreement, subjects air carriers to
absolute liability for Article 17 injuries suffered on flights connected with the United
States, the Court chose not to subject international air carriers to "strict liability for
purely mental distress." Id.
348. See Ludwig Weber & Arie Jakob, Current Developments Concerning the Reform of
the Warsaw Convention, 21 ANNALS AIR & SPACE L. pt. 2, at 303 (1996) (describing efforts
in 1990s to reform liability limits of Warsaw Convention).
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the adoption of a new international treaty.3 49 Nevertheless,
many of these measures call for further efforts on the part of the
ICAO and the world's governments aimed at providing multilat-
eral treaty reform of the Warsaw Convention's liability limits. 35 0
A. The IATA Intercarrier Agreement
Modernizing the Warsaw Convention's liability limits was
the goal of the drafters of the IATA Intercarrier Agreement.351
By signing the IATA Intercarrier Agreement, participating air
carriers agreed to waive the Warsaw Convention's liability lim-
its. 352 As a result, the drafters of the IATA Intercarrier Agree-
ment anticipated eliminating the lengthy and expensive process
of proving an air carrier's willful misconduct which passengers
must undergo to evade the Warsaw Convention's liability lim-
its. 353 For that reason, legal and lay commentators have viewed
the IATA Intercarrier Agreement as a welcome improvement. 354
1. Background
In February 1995, the DOT granted antitrust immunity to
IATA for intercarrier discussions regarding increases in the War-
saw Convention's liability limits.3 55 In June 1995, representatives
of sixty-seven international air carriers attended an IATA confer-
349. Id.
350. Id. at 306.
351. See James J. Brashear, IATA Airline Liability Conference: Carrers Prepare to Mod-
ernize the Warsaw System, 10 AIR & SPACE LAW. 1, 1 (Fall 1995) (discussing IATA Airline
Liability Conference of June 1995).
352. See Carlsen, supra note 6, at 231-32 (explaining effect. of IATA Intercarrier
Agreement on signatory air carriers).
353. IATA, APPLICATION OF THE INTERNATIONAL AIR TRANSPORT ASSOCIATION FOR
APPROVAL OF AGREEMENT, ANTITRUST IMMUNITY AND RELATED EXEMPTION RELIEF 4 (July
31, 1996) (on file with the Fordham International Law Journal) [hereinafter IATA AP-
PROVAL APPLICATION].
354. See Trial Lawryers, supra note 21 (reporting ATIA anticipation of reduced legal
costs due to IATA Intercarrier Agreement's elimination of need to prove willful miscon-
duct by air carriers); ICC Urges DOT Approval, supra note 22 (noting ICC expectation of
reduced legal costs due to IATA Intercarrier Agreement).
355. DEP'T OF TRANSP., INTERNATONAL AIR TRANSPORT ASSOCIATION: AGREEMENT
RELATING TO LAZILrn' LIMITATIONS OF THE WARSAW CONVENTION, Order 95-2-44 (Feb.
22, 1995) (on file with the Fordham International Law Journal) [hereinafter February
1995 Immunity Order]. The DOT immunity order required any agreement reached by
air carriers serving the United States to meet two conditions. Id. at 3. First, air carriers
would offer prompt compensation on a strict liability basis to passengers ticketed in the
United States with no per-passenger liability limits and with damages measured similarly
to those available in U.S. domestic aviation cases. Id. Second, air carriers would make
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ence in Washington, D.C.356 The purpose of the conference was
to discuss ways in which to modernize the Warsaw Convention's
liability limits for passengers injured or killed in international
aviation accidents. 35 7 As a result of continued discussions held
subsequent to the June 1995 meeting, IATA adopted the IATA
Intercarrier Agreement at its Annual General Meeting held in
Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia, in October 1995.358 On July 31, 1996,
IATA and the ATA jointly filed for approval from the DOT for
the IATA Intercarrier Agreement along with two implementa-
tion agreements. 359 The DOT issued a show cause order360 for
the three agreements on October 3, 1996,61 to be followed by a
notice and comment period lasting until October 24, 1996.362
The DOT subsequently approved these agreements on Novem-
ber 12, 1996.363
2. Significant Provisions
The IATA Intercarrier Agreement is an umbrella agreement
which establishes general rules compelling each participating air
carrier to waive the Warsaw Convention's liability limits by No-
vember 1, 1996.364 The goal of Paragraph 1 of the IATA Inter-
comparable compensation available to all U.S. citizens and permanent residents travel-
ing internationally by air on tickets not issued in the United States. Id.
356. See Brashear, supra note 351, at 1 (explaining goals of drafters of IATA Inter-
carrier Agreement).
357. Id. The air carriers attending the IATA conference feared another denuncia-
tion of the Warsaw Convention by the United States. Id. at 21. The air carriers wanted
to create a carrier-driven interim agreement rather than a solution produced by govern-
ments because the world's governments had proved unable to ratify the Guatemala
Protocol and the Montreal Protocol No. 3. Id.
358. See Carlsen, supra note 6, at 231-32 (discussing IATA Intercarrier Agreement).
359. Id. By July 31, 1996, fifty-six of the world's major air carriers had signed the
IATA Intercarrier Agreement. Id. at n.8; see World's Airlines Move Closer to Ease Liability
Limits, AIR SAFETY W'., Aug. 5, 1996, available in WESTLAW, Airsafw Database [hereinaf-
ter World's Airlines] (discussing IATA Intercarrier Agreement).
360. See BLAcK, supra note 54, at 1379-80 (defining show cause order as directing
interested party to present such justification which party possesses as to why particular
order should not take effect).
361. DEP'T OF TRANSP., INTERNATIONAL AIR TRANSPORT ASSOCIATION: AGREEMENT
RELATING TO LIABILITY LIMITATIONS OF THE WARSAW CONVENTrION; AIR TRANSPORT AssO-
CIATION OF AMERICA: AGREEMENT RELATING TO LIABILITY LIMITATIONS OF THE WARSAW
CONVENTION, Order No. 96-10-7(Oct. 3, 1996), (on file with the Fordham International
Law Journal) [hereinafter Show Cause Order].
362. Id. at 17-18.
363. Order Approving Agreements, supra note 11, at 1.
364. See Carlsen, supra note 6, at 231-32 (discussing IATA Intercarrier Agreement).
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carrier Agreement is to eliminate any obstruction under Article
22(1) of the Warsaw Convention to the recovery of those com-
pensatory damages for which a passenger otherwise would be eli-
gible under the law of that passenger's domicile.365 Paragraph 2
permits a signatory air carrier to waive any of the Warsaw Con-
vention Article 20(1) or Article 21 defenses, either in total or up
to a particular amount of compensatory damages.366 Paragraph
3 reserves the right of an air carrier responding to Warsaw Con-
vention Article 17 claims to seek contribution or indemnity from
other potentially responsible parties. 6 v Paragraph 4 states the
intent of participating air carriers to urge non-participating air
carriers to adopt the provisions of the LATA Intercarrier Agree-
ment in order to achieve uniform, global modification of the
Warsaw Convention without the need for government interven-
tion. 3 6 8
Under a separate implementation agreement, participating
IATA member air carriers agree to put the rules established by
the IATA Intercarrier Agreement into place by including appro-
priate provisions in their conditions of carriage and tariffs.3 69
Paragraph 1.1 of the IATA Implementation Agreement requires
365. IATA INTERCARRIER AGREEMENT, supra note 10, 1 1, at 1. Paragraph 1 states
that signatory air carriers agree:
To take action to waive the limitation of liability on recoverable compensatory
damages in Article 22 paragraph I of the Warsaw Convention as to claims for
death, wounding or other bodily injury of a passenger within the meaning of
Article 17 of the Convention, so that recoverable compensatory damages may
be determined and awarded by reference to the law of the domicile of the
passenger.
Id.; see IATA APPROVAL APPLICATION, supra note 353, at 8 (discussing paragraph 1 of
IATA Intercarrier Agreement).
366. IATA INTERCARRIER AGREEMENT, supra note 10, 2, at 1. Paragraph 2 states
that signatory air carriers agree "[t]o reserve all available defences . . . including the
waiver of any defence up to a specified monetary amount of recoverable compensatory
damages, as circumstances may warrant." Id.; see IATA APPROVAL APPLICATION, supra
note 353, at 8 (discussing Paragraph 2 of IATA Intercarrier Agreement).
367. IATA INTERCARRIER AGREEMENT, supra note 10, 3, at 1. Paragraph 3 states
that signatory air carriers agree "[t]o reserve their rights of recourse against any other
person, including rights of contribution or indemnity, with respect to any sums paid by
the carrier." Id.; see IATA APPROVAL APPLICATION, supra note 353, at 8-9 (discussing
Paragraph 3 of IATA Intercarrier Agreement).
368. IATA INTERCARRIER AGREEMENT, supra note 10, 4, at 1. Paragraph 4 states
that signatory air carriers agree "[t]o encourage other airlines involved in the interna-
tional carriage of passengers to apply the terms of this Agreement to such carriage."
Id.; see IATA APPROVAL APPLICATION, supra note 353, at 9 (discussing Paragraph 4 of
IATA Intercarrier Agreement).
369. See Carlsen, supra note 6, at 232 (discussing IATA Intercarrier Agreement).
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signatory air carriers to incorporate in their conditions of car-
riage a provision waiving the Warsaw Convention's Article 22(1)
liability limits for compensatory damages regardless of the appli-
cable law designated by the forum court or agreed to by the par-
ties.37 ° Paragraph 1.2 requires air carriers to incorporate in their
conditions of carriage a waiver providing for strict liability for
any portion of a claim up to the amount of 100,000 SDRs.3 7 1 As
an alternative to Paragraph 1.2, a signatory air carrier may incor-
porate into its conditions of carriage Paragraph 1.2, which al-
lows an air carrier to vary the amount over 100,000 SDRs for
which the air carrier agrees to be strictly liable on a route-by-
route basis as approved by appropriate governmental authori-
ties. 72 Paragraph II.1 is an optional provision which, at an air
carrier's choice, prevents the air carrier from opposing a claim-
ant's effort to have the law of a passenger's domicile determine
the amount of compensatory damages. 3
370. IATA, IATA AGREEMENT ON MEASURES TO IMPLEMENT THE IATA INTERCARRIER
AGREEMENT I 1.1, at 1 (opened for signature May 1996) (on file with the Fordham Interna-
tional Law Journal) [hereinafter IATA IMPLEMENTATION AGREEMENT]. Paragraph 1. 1 re-
quires a signatory air carrier to incorporate into its conditions of carriage a provision
indicating that the air carrier "shall not invoke the limitation of liability in Article 22(1)
of the Convention as to any claim for recoverable compensatory damages arising under
Article 17 of the Convention." Id.; see IATA APPROvAL APPLICATION, supra note 353, at 9-
10 (discussing Paragraph 1.1 of IATA Implementation Agreement).
371. IATA IMPLEMENTATION AGREEMENT, supra note 370, 1.2, at 1. Paragraph 1.2
requires a signatory air carrier to incorporate into its conditions of carriage a provision
indicating that the air carrier "shall not avail itself of any defence under Article 20(1) of
the Convention with respect to that portion of such claim which does not exceed
100,000 SDRs [unless option 11(2) is used]." Id.; see IATA APPROVAL APPLICATION, supra
note 353, at 10 (discussing Paragraph 1.2 of IATA Implementation Agreement).
372. IATA IMPLEMENTATION AGREEMENT, supra note 370, 1 11.2, at 1. Paragraph
11.2 allows a signatory air carrier the option of incorporating into its conditions of car-
riage a provision indicating that the air carrier "shall not avail itself of any defence
under Article 20(1) of the Convention with respect to that portion of such claim which
does not exceed 100,000 SDRs, except that such waiver is limited.., as may be author-
ized by governments concerned with the transportation involved" to specified amounts
for particular routes. Id.; see IATA APPROVAL APPLICATION, supra note 353, at 10 (dis-
cussing Paragraph 11.2 of IATA Implementation Agreement).
373. IATA IMPLEMENTATION AGREEMENT, supra note 370, 11.2, at 1. Paragraph
11.2 allows a signatory air carrier to choose whether to incorporate into its conditions of
carriage a provision indicating that the air carrier "agrees that subject to applicable law,
recoverable compensatory damages for such claims may be determined by reference to
the law of the domicile or permanent residence of the passenger." Id.; see IATA AP-
PROVAL APPLICATION, supra note 353, at 11 (discussing Paragraph 11.2 of IATA Imple-
mentation Agreement). This provision gives the choice of law governing compensatory
damages to a passenger because the law of the domicile, even in the United States, may
not always favor the passenger's claim. Id.
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Concurrent with IATA's efforts, the ATA developed its own
implementation agreement for participating U.S. air carriers.374
The ATA designed its implementation agreement as a means of
discontinuing a signatory air carrier's participation in the 1966
Montreal Interim Agreement.375 Under the ATA's implementa-
tion agreement, participating ATA member air carriers agree to
put the mandatory provisions of the IATA's Implementation
Agreement into place by including appropriate provisions in
their conditions of carriage and tariffs.3 76 Unlike the IATA Im-
plementation Agreement, U.S. air carriers signing the ATA Im-
plementation Agreement must agree that the law of a passen-
ger's domicile may determine how to calculate compensatory
damages, if a passenger so chooses. 377
3. Industry and World Reaction
In support of its application for DOT approval, IATA ar-
gued that the IATA Intercarrier Agreement would reduce the
costly and time-consuming practice in the United States of trying
to prove willful misconduct in order to circumvent the Warsaw
Convention's liability limits.3 78 IATA claimed that the IATA In-
tercarrier Agreement would improve the well-being of passen-
gers throughout the international aviation industry regardless of
their citizenship. 79 IATA also argued that approval of the IATA
Intercarrier Agreement would further significant U.S. foreign
policy and international comity goals and expedite international
improvement of passenger rights while maintaining the benefits
374. Carlsen, supra note 6, at 232.
375. See ATA, APPLICATION OF AIR TRANSPORT ASSOCIATION OF AMERICA FOR AP-
PROVAL OF AGREEMENT, ANTITRUST IMMUNITY AND FOR OTHER RELIEF 6 (July 31, 1996)
(on file with the Fordham International LawJournal) (discussing ATA's implementation
agreement) [hereinafter ATA APPROVAL APPLICATION].
376. Id. at 6.
377. ATA, ATA PROVISIONS IMPLEMENTING THE IATA INTERCARRIER AGREEMENT TO
BE INCLUDED IN CONDITIONS OF CARRIAGE AND TARIFFS 1.4, at 1 (openedfor signature May
16, 1996) (on file with the Fordham International Law Journal) [hereinafter ATA IMPLE-
MENTATION AGREEMENT]. Paragraph 1.4 requires a signatory air carrier to incorporate
into its conditions of carriage a provision indicating that the air carrier "agrees that
subject to applicable law, recoverable compensatory damages for such claims may be
determined by reference to the law of the domicile or permanent residence of the
passenger." Id.; see ATA APPROVAL APPLICATION, supra note 375, at 6 (discussing ATA
Implementation Agreement).
378. LATA APPROVAL APPLICATION, supra note 353, at 4.
379. Id. at 5-6.
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otherwise obtainable under the Warsaw Convention.380 Among
the eighty-five air carriers who became signatories to the IATA
Intercarrier Agreement by May 12, 1997, fifty-three air carriers
had also signed the IATA Implementation Agreement. 381
The ATA argued that approval of the ATA Implementation
Agreement would lead to damage awards for death or injury in
international aviation accidents consistent with those available in
domestic U.S. aviation accident cases.38 2 Compensatory dam-
ages would be comparable to those obtainable in U.S. domestic
aviation accident cases, because, under the ATA Implementation
Agreement, signatory air carriers would allow the passenger to
decide if the law of the passenger's domicile should dictate
damage awards. 3  Approval of the ATA Implementation Agree-
ment would avoid unnecessary disagreements with U.S. aviation
trading partners, since it anticipates that signatory air carriers
would urge widespread voluntary acceptance by non-signatory
air carriers.384
The International Chamber of Commerce383 ("ICC") sup-
ported the IATA Intercarrier Agreement because the ICC antici-
pated that the Agreement would reduce the need for litigation
in aviation disasters.38 6 The ICC also noted that approval of the
IATA Intercarrier Agreement would be unlikely to adversely im-
pact competition because air carriers would not vie with each
other for business on the basis of compensation provided in avia-
380. Id. at 12-13.
381. See Stacy Shapiro, Rates May Take Off With IATA Agreement, Bus. INS., May 12,
1997, at 3 [hereinafter Rates May Take OfJ] (describing insurance underwriters' expecta-
tion of increased liability insurance costs due to number of air carriers signatory to
IATA Intercarrier Agreement). By the summer of 1997, IATA anticipates that 100 air
carriers will have signed the IATA Intercarrier Agreement and 75 air carriers will have
put its provisions into place by signing the IATA Implementation Agreement. Id.
382. ATA APPROVAL APPLICATION, supra note 375, at 2.
383. Id. at 10.
384. Id. at 2.
385. See ICC, CONSOLIDATED COMMENTS OF THE INTERNATIONAL CHAMBER OF COM-
MERCE (Aug. 21, 1996) (on file with the Fordham International Law Journal) [hereinafter
AUGUST 1996 ICC COMMENTS] (describing International Chamber of Commerce
("ICC") support of IATA Intercarrier Agreement). Founded in 1919, the ICC is a non-
governmental association of thousands of companies and business organizations lo-
cated in more than 130 countries. Id. at 2. The ICC's Commission on Air Transport
periodically publishes position papers on crucial issues in international aviation. Id. at
3.
386. Id. at 6-7; see ICC Urges DOT Approval, supra note 22, at 306 (discussing ICC's
positive reaction to IATA Intercarrier Agreement).
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tion accidents.38 7 The ICC expressed the view that it would pre-
fer to maintain the Warsaw Convention's goal of harmonizing
global legal systems to a complete rewrite of the Warsaw Conven-
318tion.
ATLA also urged the approval of the IATA Intercarrier
Agreement.3 89 Under the IATA Intercarrier Agreement, plain-
tiffs would not have to prove willful misconduct, therefore ATLA
predicted a reduction in long and costly litigation.3 9' Neverthe-
less, ATLA still would prefer the addition of a fifth jurisdiction
for filing suit, that of the passenger's domicile. 91
The Aerospace Industries Association 92 ("AIA") urged
DOT approval of the IATA Intercarrier Agreement due to the
inequitable effect which occurs when passengers or their families
file claims against third parties, such as AIA members, in an bid
to obtain appropriate compensation for their losses.393 The AIA
noted that approval of the IATA Intercarrier Agreement would
give international passengers the advantage of a liability system
superior to that available to domestic U.S. passengers because
domestic passengers must prove that an air carrier neglected to
exercise the highest degree of care.39 4 By comparison, the IATA
Intercarrier Agreement would give the international passenger
387. AUGUST 1996 ICC COMMENTS, supra note 385, at 7.
388. Id. at 5; ICC Favours Revision, Not Rewrite, of Warsaw Convention Liability Rules,
AVIATION EUR., Mar. 14, 1996, at 3.
389. ATLA, COMMENTS BY THE ASSOCIATION OF TRIAL LAWYERS OF AMERICA ON THE
APPLICATION OF INTERNATIONAL AIR TRANSPORT ASSOCIATION FOR APPROVAL OF AGREE-
MENT, ANTITRUST IMMUNITY AND RELATED EXEMPTION RELIEF (Aug. 21, 1996) (on file
with the Fordham International Law Journal) [hereinafter AUGUST 1996 ATLA COM-
MENTS]; see Trial Lauyers, supra note 21 at 320 (discussing ATLA reaction to IATA Inter-
carrier Agreement).
390. AUGUST 1996 ATIA COMMENTS, supra note 389, at 2; see Trial Lawyers, supra
note 21 at 320 (discussing ATLA's reaction to IATA Intercarrier Agreement).
391. AUGUST 1996 ATLA COMMENTS, supra note 389, at 2. ATIA noted that Article
28 of the Warsaw Convention may force the survivors of a U.S. citizen who was traveling
overseas and who died on a flight between foreign points to file their claim overseas.
Id.; see Trial Lawyers, supra note 21, at 320 (discussing ATLA reaction to IATA Intercar-
rier Agreement).
392. See ALA, AEROSPACE INDUSTRIES ASSOCIATION'S MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF
APPLICATIONS FILED BY IATA AND ATA FOR APPROVAL OF AGREEMENTS RELATING TO LIA-
BILITY LIMITATIONS OF THE WARSAW CONVENTION (Aug. 21, 1996) (on file with the Ford-
ham International Law Journal) [hereinafter AUGUST 1996 AIA COMMENTS] (describing
Aerospace Industries Association ("AIA") organization). Fifty-two suppliers of commer-
cial aircraft, their engines, and other component parts belong to the ALA. Id. at 1.
393. Id.
394. Id.
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an absolute right to recover damages up to 100,000 SDRs and a
presumed right to recover full damages, except where an air car-
rier can prove that it took all requisite steps to prevent the acci-
dent. 395
Although the Victims Families' Associations3 96 urged the
DOT to approve the IATA Intercarrier Agreement, these organi-
zations wanted the DOT to further modify the IATA Intercarrier
Agreement's provisions.3 9 7 The Victims Families' Associations
wanted the DOT to require either an unlimited waiver by air
carriers of the Article 20(1) defenses or a limited waiver set at an
amount greater than 100,000 SDRs.39 8 The Victims Families' As-
sociations also wanted the DOT to require that air carriers flying
to and from the United States agree to the establishment of a
fifth jurisdiction for filing claims based upon the domicile of the
passenger so that passengers could obtain damage awards in U.S.
courts, regardless of the ticket purchase location.3 99
B. The DOT Proposal
Due to the optional nature of some of the provisions in-
cluded in the IATA and ATA implementation agreements, the
DOT proposed the inclusion of additional provisions to further
protect U.S. citizens involved in international air transporta-
tion.4 °0 Among other requirements, the DOT proposed that a
passenger should have the option of filing suit against an air car-
395. Id.
396. VICTIMS FAMILIES' ASSOCIATIONS, RESPONSE OF THE VICTIMS FAMILIES' ASSOCIA-
TIONS TO APPLICATION OF THE INTERNATIONAL AIR TRANSPORT ASSOCIATION FOR AP-
PROVAL OF AGREEMENT, ANTITRUST IMMUNITY AND RELATED EXEMPTION RELIEF AND MO-
TION FOR LEAVE TO FILE LATE PLEADING (Aug. 22, 1996) (on file with the Fordham Inter-
national Law Journal) [hereinafter AUGUST 1996 VICTIMS FAMILIES' COMMENT]. The
Victims Families' Associations include the relatives of passengers who died in the 1983
Korean Air Lines Flight 007 air disaster, in addition to relatives of victims of the Pan-Am
103 air disaster at Lockerbie, Scotland and the TWA 800 Disaster at Long Island, New
York. Id. at 1 n. 1. The American Association for Families of KAL 007 Victims was the
first significant lobbying group organized by relatives of the victims of an international
air disaster. SeeJan Hoffman, In His Daughter's Memory; Grieving Father's 14-Year Crusade
Helps Air Crash Victims, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 31, 1997, at B1 (describing protracted efforts of
Hans Ephraimson-Abt, Chairman of American Association for Families of KAL 007 Vic-
tims, to convince U.S. air carriers to effect changes aimed at faster resolution of air
disaster lawsuits). Id.
397. See AUGUST 1996 VICTIMS FAMIuES' COMMENT, supra note 396, at 2.
398. Id. at 10.
399. Id. at 12.
400. Show Cause Order, supra note 361, at 9.
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rier in a fifth forum, that of the jurisdiction of the courts of the
passenger's domicile or residence. °1 IATA predicted that non-
U.S. air carriers which had previously signed the IATA Intercar-
rier Agreement would withdraw those prior consents in reaction
to the imposition of the DOT's additional provisions.1 2 In addi-
tion, the insurance industry became concerned that the DOT's
additional provisions would have an inflationary effect on avia-
tion industry insurance rates.4 °3
1. Background
When it granted discussion authority to IATA in February
1995, the DOT stated that it was doing so with certain expecta-
tions.40 4 In situations where air carriers ticketed passengers in
the United States, the DOT expected that IATA would develop
an intercarrier agreement which would compensate passengers
in a timely manner on a strict liability basis with no per passen-
ger limits and with damage awards comparable to those obtaina-
ble in U.S. domestic aviation cases.4°5 The DOT also expected
that air carriers would extend similar coverage to U.S. citizens
traveling internationally in situations where air carriers ticketed
such passengers in locations outside the United States.40 6 With
these objectives in mind, the DOT reacted to the optional na-
ture of some of the provisions included in the IATA and ATA
implementation agreements by proposing the inclusion of addi-
tional provisions. 4 7
2. Significant Provisions
In its show cause order, the DOT proposed that the op-
tional application of the law of the domicile provision become
mandatory for all air travel to or from the United States. 40 8 An
401. Id. at 13.
402. IATA, OBJECTIONS OF THE INTERNATIONAL AIR TRANSPORT ASSOCIATION 1-2
(Oct. 24, 1996) (on file with the Fordham International Law Journal) [hereinafter Ocro-
BER 1996 IATA OBJECTIONS].
403. See DOT Conditions Could "Derail" World Liability Agreement, AIR SAFETY WK.,
Oct. 14, 1996, available in WESTLAW, Airsafw Database [hereinafter DOT Conditions]
(discussing aviation industry insurance rates).
404. February 1995 Immunity Order, supra note 355, at 3.
405. Id.
406. Id.
407. Show Cause Order, supra note 361, at 9.
408. Id. at 9-10.
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additional DOT proposal included requiring air carriers travel-
ing to or from the United States to either ensure that all interlin-
ing air carriers were parties to the IATA Intercarrier Agreement
or to agree to assume liability for the entire trip.40 9 The DOT
also proposed establishing a requirement that air carriers make
previously existing liability provisions which were more generous
than those required by the IATA Intercarrier Agreement avail-
able to passengers traveling to or from the United States.41 ° Fi-
nally, the DOT proposed that air carriers submit to the jurisdic-
tion of the courts of the passenger's domicile or residence.411
3. Industry and World Reaction
IATA objected to the DOT's proposed additional provi-
sions, stating that imposition of these provisions would force the
non-U.S. air carrier signatories to withdraw their prior consents
to the IATA Intercarrier Agreement and the IATA Implementa-
tion Agreement. 412 IATA pointed out that passengers would not
be able to enforce the DOT's proposed additional provisions be-
cause such provisions would conflict with several existing provi-
409. Id. at 10. The DOT proposed that:
For transportation to and from the U.S., the provisions of the agreement
would apply with respect to any passengers purchasing a ticket on an airline
party to the agreements, including interline travel on carriers not party to the
agreements. The carrier ticketing the passenger, or, if that carrier is not a
party to the [a]greements, the carrier operating to or from the United States,
would have the obligation either to ensure that all interlining carriers were
parties to the [a]greements, as conditioned, or to itself assume liability for the
entire journey.
Id.
410. Id. at 11. The DOT proposed:
To require that all tariffs, contracts of carriage or other similar provisions ap-
plied by any carrier, in anyjurisdiction, to the extent any such provision would
be more favorable to its passengers with respect to recoveries for passenger
deaths and injuries.., than the provisions of the IATA and ATA Agreements
... shall apply equally to all passengers on services to and from the United
States. To the extent that the carrier has agreed, whether pursuant to Govern-
mental regulation or otherwise, to liability provisions favorable to passengers,
albeit limited to certain jurisdictions, or certain classes of passengers, the fail-
ure to extend the same benefits to U.S. citizen or permanent resident passen-
gers..., traveling in international air transportation would constitute unjustifi-
able and unreasonable discrimination ... and could not be accepted for oper-
ations to and from the United States.
Id.
411. Id. at 13.
412. OCTOBER 1996 IATA OBJEcTIONS, supra note 402, at 1-2.
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sions of the Warsaw Convention.413 IATA argued that the War-
saw Convention does not provide for deviation from filing suits
in anyjurisdictional forum other than the four fora listed in Arti-
cle 28. 414 IATA also argued that the DOT's proposed provision
requiring air carriers to either ensure that all interlining air car-
riers were parties to the IATA Intercarrier Agreement or to
agree to assume liability for the entire trip contravened Article
30 of the Warsaw Convention.415 IATA asserted that only an
amendment to the Warsaw Convention would serve to imple-
ment the DOT's proposed additional provisions.4 16 The ATA ar-
gued that approval of its implementation agreement without
conditions would permit signatory air carriers to offer immedi-
ate benefits to passengers.41 7 Interim approval would help the
ATA's efforts to influence non-signatory air carriers to sign the
ATA Implementation Agreement because such air carriers would
be more likely to sign an agreement that already had DOT ap-
proval.418
The AIA also urged unconditional approval by the DOT as a
means of preventing the Warsaw Convention's existing liability
limits from remaining in place to the detriment of passengers as
well as third parties such as the commercial aircraft suppliers
who are the AIA's members. 419 The Association of European
413. Id. Annex B, at 4-5. Article 32 of the Warsaw Convention provides that:
Any clause contained in the contract and all special agreements entered into
before the damage occurred by which the parties purport to infringe the rules
laid down by this convention, whether by deciding the law to be applied, or by
altering the rules as to jurisdiction, shall be null and void.
Warsaw Convention, supra note 3, art 32, 49 Stat. at 3021, 137 L.N.T.S. at 29-31.
414. OCTOBER 1996 IATA OBJECTIONS, supra note 402, Annex B, at 5-6.
415. Id. at 7-8. Article 30 of the Warsaw Convention regulates an air carrier's liabil-
ity where different successive air carriers transport passengers, baggage, or goods. War-
saw Convention, supra note 3, art. 30(1), 49 Stat. at 3021, 137 L.N.T.S. at 29. Under
Article 30(2), "[i]n the case of transportation of this nature, the passenger or his repre-
sentative can take action only against the carrier who performed the transportation
during which the accident or the delay occurred, save in the case where, by express
agreement, the first carrier has assumed liability for the whole journey." Id. art. 30(2),
49 Stat. at 3021, 137 L.N.T.S. at 29.
416. OCTOBER 1996 IATA OBJECTIONS, supra note 402, Annex B, at 8.
417. ATA, COMMENTS OF THE AIR TRANSPORT ASSOCIATION OF AMERICA ON DOT
ORDER 96-10-7 AND FOR INTERIM APPROVAL OF AGREEMENT, ANTITRUST IMMUNITY AND FOR
OTHER RELIEF 6 (Oct. 24, 1996) (on file with the Fordham International Law Journal)
[hereinafter OCTOBER 1996 ATA OBJECTIONS].
418. Id. at 7-8.
419. AIA, THE AEROSPACE INDUSTRIES ASSOCIATION'S COMMENTS ON ORDER 96-10-7
REGARDING APPLICATIONS FILED BY IATA AND ATA FOR APPROVAL OF AGREEMENTS RELAT-
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Airlines urged unconditional approval by the DOT because this
association viewed the IATA Intercarrier Agreement as the best
consensus achievable by the international aviation industry.42 °
The Regional Airline Association 42 1 ("RAA") objected to the
DOT's proposed additional provisions as especially detrimental
to regional air carriers.42 2
The aviation and insurance industries disagreed as to
whether the IATA Intercarrier Agreement would cause insur-
ance premiums to rise for air carriers.42 3 Representatives of the
insurance industry felt that the DOT had underestimated the an-
ticipated effect of the DOT's proposed additional provisions on
aviation industry insurance rates.424 Although aviation insurance
costs had decreased recently,4 2 5 insurance underwriters were un-
ING TO LIABILITY LIMITATIONS OF THE WARSAW CONVENTION 1-2 (Oct. 24, 1996) (on file
with the Fordham International Law Journal).
420. AEA, ANSWER OF THE ASSOCIATION OF EUROPEAN AIRLINES IN SUPPORT OF IATA
OBJECtIONS TO ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE 96-10-7 at 1 (Oct. 31, 1996) (on file with the
Fordham International Law Journal). The Association of European Airlines commented
to the DOT that only treaty action by the world's governments could bring about any
further improvements beyond those of the IATA Intercarrier Agreement. Id.
421. RAA, ANSWER OF REGIONAL AIRLINE ASSOCIATION 1 (Oct. 31, 1996) (on file
with the Fordham International Law Journal). The Regional Airline Association ("RAA"),
the trade association of the regional air carrier industry, consists of 70 member air
carriers whose aircraft transport 94% of the total number of passengers traveling on
regional air carriers of any kind. Id.
422. Id. at 1-2. As an example, the RAA pointed out that:
If a passenger moves on hypothetical Regional Airlines from the U.S. to Can-
ada then on hypothetical Transoceanic Airlines from Canada to Africa and,
finally, between two points in Africa on hypothetical Safari Airlines and is
killed on Safari, the passenger could sue Regional Airlines for unlimited dam-
ages if Safari Airlines is not a party to the agreements. Regional carriers could
not reasonably assume such liability for all the reasons mentioned by ATA, but
magnified by the small size of these airlines.
Id. at 2-3. The RAA noted that the DOT defines regional carriers as small businesses
when such air carriers provide air transportation in small aircraft having up to 60 seats
and an 18,000 pound payload capacity. Id. at 3.
423. Edward Unsworth, Airline Group Moves to Lift International Liability Limits: U.S.,
E. . Approval Still Needed, Bus. INS., Aug. 5, 1996, at 40.
424. LLOYD'S AVIATION UNDERWRITERS' ASSOCIATION & AVIATION INSURANCE OF-
FICES ASSOCIATION, JOINT COMMENTS OF LLOYD'S AVIATION UNDERWRITERS' ASSOCIATION
AND AVIATION INSURANCE OFFICES ASSOCIATION 2 (Oct. 24, 1996) (on file with the Ford-
ham International Law Journal). According to the Joint Comments, research on aviation
industry insurance rates indicated that the aviation industry could anticipate an in-
crease in claims costs as a result of implementing the IATA Intercarrier Agreement. Id.
The DOT's proposed additional provisions would likely increase claims costs even fur-
ther. Id.
425. Lee S. Kreindler, The End of Airline Liability Limits, N.Y.L.J., Aug. 30, 1996, at 3
[hereinafter End of Liability Linuits]. Today, the aviation industry has grown very large,
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sure whether the Trans World Airlines Flight 800 disaster of July
1996 would reverse this trend.428 IATA originally believed that
insurance rates would not automatically increase subsequent to
DOT approval of the IATA Intercarrier Agreement because a
given air carrier's insurance claims record influences its insur-
ance rates. 42 7 The DOT's proposed additional provisions radi-
cally changed those assumptions.428
In reaction to public commentary regarding its show cause
order, the DOT deferred action on most of its proposed addi-
tional provisions. 429 Nevertheless, the DOT did insist on includ-
ing its additional proposed provision that the optional applica-
tion of the law of the domicile provision become mandatory for
all air travel to or from the United States.43 ° Many international
air carriers hesitated at the prospect of having U.S. law govern
the calculation of compensatory damages for airline disasters in-
volving U.S. passengers.43 1 At IATA's request, the DOT recon-
sidered this condition to the IATA Intercarrier Agreement. 432
IATA argued that a significant number of international air carri-
ers would not adhere to the IATA Intercarrier Agreement if the
DOT did not remove the condition providing for mandatory de-
termination of compensatory damages under the law of the pas-
senger's domicile for all air travel to or from the United
States.433 Persuaded by IATA's argument, the DOT removed this
while the number of major accidents is comparatively small, resulting in relatively low
insurance costs for air carriers. Id.
426. See Unsworth, supra note 423 (discussing aviation industry insurance rates).
On July 17, 1996, directly after its departure from New York's John F. Kennedy Airport,
Trans World Airlines' Paris-bound Flight 800 crashed into the Atlantic Ocean, killing all
230 persons aboard. Id.
427. Id.
428. See DOT Conditions, supra note 403 (discussing aviation industry insurance
rates).
429. Order Approving Agreements, supra note 11, at 6.
430. Id. at 7.
431. See Rice, supra note 166, at 3 (discussing IATA Intercarrier Agreement).
432. DEP'T OF TRANSP., INTERNATIONAL AIR TRANSPORT ASSOCIATION: AGREEMENT
RELATING TO LIABILrIY LIMITATIONS OF THE WARSAW CONVENTION; AIR TRANSPORT Asso-
CIATION OF AMERICA: AGREEMENT RELATING TO LtABILrrY LIMITATIONS OF THE WARSAW
CONVENTION, Order No. 97-1-2 (Jan. 8, 1997), available in WESTIAW, Ftran-dot
Database [hereinafter Reconsideration Order].
433. IATA, INTERNATIONAL AIR TRANSPORT ASSOCIATION'S PETITION FOR RECONSID-
ERATION OF ORDER 96-11-6 at 5 (Dec. 20, 1996) (on file with the Fordham International
Law Journal). IATA noted that many signatory air carriers objected to this provision
because "there is no international aviation treaty precedent for the law of the domicile
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provision when it modified its approval of the IATA Intercarrier
Agreement on January 8, 1997.434
C. The EC Proposal
Dissatisfaction with the Warsaw Convention's liability limits
prompted representatives of the European Community, in addi-
tion to Norway and Sweden, to gather in 1993 to debate passen-
ger liability limits. 435 Among other provisions, the most recent
version of the EC Proposal provides for an air carrier to disburse
a nonrefundable advance payment to a passenger or his family
within ten days of an airline disaster.436 Several air carriers have
reacted with concern that compliance with the terms of the EC
Proposal could prove more'of a hardship than compliance with
the IATA Intercarrier Agreement. 43 7 A further criticism of the
EC Proposal has been that the European Commission risked
complicating already existing reform efforts such as the IATA In-
tercarrier Agreement by not waiting longer to present its own
proposal. 38
1. Background
In January 1993, representatives of the European Commu-
nity, in addition to other countries such as Norway and Sweden,
met in Brussels, Belgium to discuss the inappropriateness of the
Warsaw Convention's liability limits. 43 9 The representatives were
concerned about the effect that increased liability limits would
provision and many carriers believe that any harmonization of choice of law should be
undertaken at intergovernmental level." Id. at 4.
434. Reconsideration Order, supra note 432, at 5.
435. See Bruno Bertucci, A European Perspective on Air Carrier Liability, 9 AIR & SPACE
LAW. 1 (Summer 1994) (explaining concerns which promptedJanuary 1993 conference
regarding Warsaw Convention liability limits).
436. See Official Journal of the European Communities, Amended Proposal for a
Council Regulation (EC) on Air Carrier Liability In Case of Accidents, COM (96) 663
Final, O.J. C 29/04, art. 3.2, at 14 (1997) [hereinafter Amended EC Proposal].
437. See Stacy Shapiro, Part of EC Proposal Has Airlines Balking: Proposal Goes Beyond
JATA Agreement, Bus. INS., May 12, 1997, at 14 [hereinafter Airlines Balking] (noting that
terms of EC Proposal are more extensive than IATA Intercarrier Agreement).
438. EU: EU/Transport, Reuter Textline, Dec. 31, 1996, available in LEXIS, Intlaw
Library, Txtec file.
439. See Bertucci, supra note 435, at 1 (discussingJanuary 1993 conference regard-
ing Warsaw Convention liability limits). The Directorate General of the European
Commission responsible for Transport Policy convened the meeting out of concern
about the Warsaw Convention's low liability limits. Id.
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have on aviation industry insurance premiums. 440 A study com-
missioned by the representatives concluded that insurance pre-
miums would not rise drastically because less litigation would re-
sult from an increase in the Warsaw Convention's liability limits
to a level suitable for accommodating claims.441
Concurrent with the meeting of the European Community
representatives, the European Civil Aviation Conference" 2
("ECAC") created a task force to propose changes to the Warsaw
Convention liability limits." In addition to suggesting an in-
crease of liability limits from 100,000 SDRs to 250,000 SDRs, 4 "
the ECAC task force recommended the prompt payment of a
nonrefundable sum to an injured passenger or his nearest rela-
tive in the event of death." 5 ECAC decided that the easiest
method of implementing such an arrangement was by means of
an intercarrier agreement.'
On December 20, 1995, the European Commission 447 final-
ized its proposal for increased air carrier liability. 44 The Euro-
pean Commission recommended waiving all liability limits, in
addition to providing for strict liability up to 100,000 European
Currency Units ("ECUs") .449 The European Commission advo-
cated providing a victim or his relatives with a nonrefundable
advance payment within ten days of an airline disaster. 450 The
European Commission also proposed allowing passengers to
choose which jurisdiction in which to file legal claims against air
440. See EC Proposal, supra note 25, at 5 (discussing January 1993 conference on
Warsaw Convention).
441. Id.
442. See Bertucci, supra note 435, at 14 (describing European Civil Aviation Con-
ference ("ECAC") task force on Warsaw Convention). Civil aviation directors repre-
senting most European governments belong to ECAC. Id.
443. See id. at 14 (describing European Civil Aviation Conference ("ECAC") task
force on Warsaw Convention liability limits).
444. Id.
445. Id.
446. Id.
447. JOHN MCCORMICK, THE EUROPEAN UNION: POLITICS AND POLICIES 10 (1996).
The chief executive body of the European Union, the European Commission, is respon-
sible for the proposal and implementation of European Union laws and policies. Id.
448. EC Proposal, supra note 25.
449. Id. at 7. The European Currency Unit ("ECU") is a currency unit linked to a
weighted basket of European currencies. McCORMICK, supra note 447, at 234. The
member states anticipate using the ECU as a common currency in an effort to achieve
future monetary stability by the end of this century. Id. at 237.
450. EC Proposal, supra note 25, art 4(1), at 12.
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carriers, including the jurisdiction of the passenger's domi-
cile.451
The Economic and Social Committee of the European
Commission tentatively approved the EC Proposal, subject to
clarifying amendments. 452 The Economic and Social Committee
requested more information concerning how and when air carri-
ers would make advance payments to victims and their rela-
tives.4 5 The Committee was also concerned about the possible
effects of higher costs on smaller airlines.4 54 It therefore sug-
gested that a passenger should have to prove fault on the part of
an air carrier in order to qualify for higher liability payments.455
The European Parliament 45 6 subsequently endorsed the EC
Proposal in September 1996, subject to amendments. 4 7 Shortly
thereafter, the European Union Transport Ministers also en-
dorsed the EC Proposal.458 On January 30, 1997, the European
Commission amended the EC Proposal to provide for strict lia-
bility up to 120,000 ECUs.459 The revised EC Proposal also pro-
vided that the amount of the air carrier's nonrefundable ad-
vance payment should be sufficient to meet the immediate eco-
nomic requirements of the victim or his relatives.46 ° As of May
12, 1997, the Amended EC Proposal remained subject to review
by the European Parliament.461
2. Significant Provisions
The EC Proposal eliminates liability limits altogether and
calls for strict liability for damages up to 120,000 ECUs.4 2 In
451. Id.
452. Opinion of the Economic and Social Committee on the "Proposal for a Coun-
cil Regulation (EC) on Air Carrier Liability In Case of Air Accidents," O.J. C 212/09
(1996), at 38-40 (May 1996).
453. Id. art. 4.3.1, at 39.
454. Id. art. 4.3.2, at 39.
455. Id.
456. McCoiMicy, supra note 447, at 10. The European Parliament acts as the leg-
islative body of the European Union. Id.
457. EU. Proposal - Amended Draft Regulation Re Air Carrier Liability, Reuter Textline,
Jan. 24, 1997, available in LEXIS, Intlaw Library, Txtec file.
458. EU Transport Ministers Agree on Liability Reform, AVIATION DALy, Dec. 16, 1996,
at 433.
459. Amended EC Proposal, supra note 436, art. 3.2, at 14.
460. Id. art. 4.1, at 14.
461. See Airlines Balking, supra note 437, at 14 (noting that European Parliament
could approve Amended EC Proposal as early as June 1997).
462. Amended EC Proposal, supra note 436, art. 3, at 14. Article 3 provides that:
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addition, it requires an air carrier to tender a nonrefundable ad-
vance payment in an amount sufficient to satisfy immediate eco-
nomic need to a victim or his or her family within ten days of an
airline disaster."6 This amount could be offset later against the
amount of a final settlement. 464 Furthermore, the EC Proposal
provided for a fifth jurisdiction, that of the passenger's domicile,
in addition to the four existing jurisdictions in which plaintiffs
can file legal claims against air carriers.465 The EC Proposal's
provisions would be compulsory only for EC member state air
carriers.466 Non-EC air carriers must notify passengers that the
EC Proposal does not apply to such air carriers." 7 The EC Pro-
posal would require non-EC carriers to inform passengers at the
time of ticket purchase that the EC Proposal would not protect
1. The amount of the pecuniary compensation that a Community air carrier
has to sustain in the event of the death, wounding or any other bodily injury
suffered by a passenger shall not be subject to any legal, conventional or con-
tractual limits.
2. For any damages up to the sum of ECU 120,000 the Community air carrier
shall not exclude or limit his liability by proving that he and his agents have
taken all necessary measures to avoid the damage or that it was impossible for
him or them to take such measures.
3. If the carrier proves that the damage was caused by or contributed to by the
negligence of the injured person the court may, in accordance with the provi-
sions of its own law exonerate the carrier wholly or partly from his liability.
Id.
463. Id. art 4(1), at 14. Article 4(1) provides that [t]he carrier shall without delay,
and in any event not later than ten days after the identity of the person entitled to
compensation has been established make such advance payments as may be required to
meet immediate economic needs. Id.
464. Id. art. 4(2), at 12. Article 4(2) provides that "[t]he payments under para-
graph 1 shall not constitute recognition of liability and may be offset against any subse-
quent sums paid on the basis of the Community air carrier liability, but are not returna-
ble under any circumstances." Id.
465. Id. art. 7, at 15. Article 7 provides that "[a]n action for damages in the case of
accidents involving Community air carriers may, in addition to the rights conferred by
Article 28 of the Warsaw Convention, be brought before the courts of the Member State
where the passenger at the time of the accident had his domicile." Id.
466. Id. art. 5, at 14-15.
467. Id. art. 5(3), at 15. Article 5(3) provides that:
Air carriers established outside the Community, operating to, from and within
the Community and not subject to the obligations referred to in Articles 3 and
4 shall expressly and clearly inform the passengers thereof, .at the time of
purchase of the ticket at the carrier's agencies, travel agencies, or check-in
counters located in the territory of a Member State. Air carriers shall on re-
quest provide the passengers with a form setting out their conditions. The fact
that the limit is indicated on the ticket document does not constitute suffi-
cient information.
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passengers on non-EC carriers' flights.
468
3. Industry and World Reaction
The European Centre of Enterprises with Public Participa-
tion and of Enterprises of General Economic Interest criticized
the EC Proposal in December 1996.469 This association's posi-
tion was that the EC should have waited for the outcome of
other international initiatives such as the IATA Intercarrier
Agreement. 470 Otherwise, proponents of the EC Proposal risked
complicating and counteracting already existing reform ef-
forts.47 1
Air carriers have expressed concern that the EC Proposal
could become more burdensome than the IATA Intercarrier
Agreement. 472 Article 4(1) of the EC Proposal, requiring ad-
vance payments to a victim or his relatives within ten days, could
prove onerous due to the difficulty in proving to whom an air
carrier owes such payments.473 In addition, the air carriers were
afraid that the notice provisions of Article 5(3) of the EC Propo-
sal would have the effect of forcing non-EC air carriers to adver-
tise the fact that they do not provide the same liability coverage
as EC member state air carriers.4 74
D. The ICAO Draft Proposal for a New International Convention
On May 9, 1997, the Legal Committee of the ICAO ap-
proved a draft text of a new international convention reforming
the Warsaw Convention's liability limits. 4 75 In comparison to at-
tempts made by other entities, the goal of the ICAO's draft con-
vention was to maintain the Warsaw Convention's basic structure
as an instrument of international law while responding to con-
cerns about modernizing passenger liability limits. 4 76 The draft
468. Id.
469. EU: EU/Transport, Reuter Textline, Dec. 31, 1996, available in LEXIS, Intlaw
Library. Txtec file.
470. Id.
471. Id.
472. Airlines Balking, supra note 437, at 14.
473. Id.
474. Id.
475. International Effort, supra note 27 (describing ICAO efforts to reform Warsaw
Convention's liability limits).
476. See Weber & Jakob, supra note 348, at 313 (describing purposes behind
ICAO's draft convention).
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convention provides for a two tiered liability system based upon
strict liability up to 100,000 SDRs and unlimited fault-based lia-
bility beyond that limit.4 77 Insurance industry representatives an-
ticipate that such provisions would result in a nominal rise in
insurance premium costS.4 78  Legal practitioners have recog-
nized the benefit which the ICAO draft convention would have
as a legal instrument backed by the force of international law as
compared to contractual agreements such as the IATA Intercar-
rier Agreement. 479
1. Background
In an effort to accelerate the reform of the liability limits of
the Warsaw Convention, the ICAO conducted a socio-economic
study analyzing air carrier liability limits throughout the
world.4"' The results of the study indicated that dissatisfaction
with air carrier liability limits was not confined to isolated geo-
graphic areas of the world.48 ' Furthermore, the study showed
that raising the Warsaw Convention's liability limits would neces-
sitate increasing liability insurance costs for air carriers by nomi-
nal amounts averaging below US$2 per round-trip air ticket.4 2
Upon the release of the study results in January 1996, the
ICAO established a Secretariat Study Group to assist the ICAO
Legal Bureau in developing an ICAO instrument whose purpose
would be to advance the reform of the Warsaw Convention's lia-
bility limits. 483 The Secretariat Study Group sought to incorpo-
rate those elements of the Warsaw Convention that had been
able to withstand the test of time over the previous sixty years
while simultaneously reforming the more outdated aspects of
the Warsaw Convention's liability limits.484 As a result of the ef-
477. See id. at 312 (describing liability provisions of ICAO draft convention).
478. See International Effort, supra note 27 (reporting insurance industry reaction to
ICAO draft convention).
479. See id. (noting uncertainty expressed by legal practitioners over contractual
nature of IATA Intercarrier Agreement, in comparison to ICAO draft convention).
480. See Weber & Jakob, supra note 348, at 306-07 (detailing ICAO efforts to can-
vass international governmental satisfaction with Warsaw Convention's liability limits).
481. Id. at 307.
482. Id.
483. Id. at 308.
484. See id. at 311 (explaining goal of Secretariat Study Group). The Secretariat
Study Group viewed the new convention it drafted as a means of replacing "the current
complex situation of protocol-to-protocol amendments while, at the same time, preserv-
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forts of the ICAO Legal Bureau, assisted by the Secretariat Study
Group, the Legal Committee of the ICAO met from April 28 to
May 9, 1997 to review a draft text of a new international conven-
tion reforming the Warsaw Convention's liability limits. 485 The
ICAO Legal Committee approved the draft text on May 9, 1997,
in preparation for adoption by delegates from ICAO member
states at a diplomatic conference scheduled for 1998.486 Ratifica-
tion of the convention by ICAO member states could occur as
soon as 1999.487
2. Significant Provisions
The ICAO draft convention maintains the general structure
of the Warsaw Convention while integrating provisions of other
legal agreements such as the Hague and Montreal Protocols as a
means of sustaining established judicial precedents wherever fea-
sible.4 88 The ICAO draft convention creates a two-tier liability
system providing for strict liability for death or bodily injury up
to an amount of 100,000 SDRs.489 Above that level, the amount
of second tier liability depends upon a passenger proving that an
air carrier was negligent, an air carrier proving it was free of
fault, or an air carrier proving it carried out all possible steps to
thwart the occurrence of the air disaster.490 The ICAO draft con-
vention also provides for a fifth jurisdiction, that of a passenger's
domicile, for filing claims against an air carrier.491
3. Industry and World Reaction
Insurance underwriters believe that the liability provisions
of the ICAO draft convention would necessitate only nominal air
ticket cost increases to cover air carriers' additional insurance
ing the vast body ofjudicial precedents through the application of the operative parts
of the Warsaw System." Id. at 312.
485. Id. at 312-13.
486. See International Effort, supra note 27 (reporting ICAO efforts to reform War-
saw Convention's liability limits).
487. Id.
488. See Weber & Jakob, supra note 348, at 312 (describing motivation behind
structure of ICAO draft convention).
489. Id.
490. Draft Treaty In Progress, AIRLINE FIN. NEws, May 19, 1997, available in
WESTLAW, Airfin Database [hereinafter Draft Treaty] (describing liability limits of
ICAO draft convention).
491. International Effort, supra note 27 (noting ICAO draft convention provision for
fifth jurisdiction for filing of passenger claims against air carriers).
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requirements.492 The DOT would probably advocate U.S. Sen-
ate ratification of the ICAO draft convention because it provides
fifth jurisdiction rights by allowing a passenger to file a claim
against an air carrier in the country of the passenger's domi-
cile.49 Some legal practitioners have voiced apprehension that
the provisions of the ICAO draft convention requiring a passen-
ger to prove an air carrier's negligence could lead to increased
difficulties in collecting damages in comparison to the provi-
sions of the IATA Intercarrier Agreement.494 Other legal practi-
tioners favor the ICAO's requirement of proof of air carrier neg-
ligence because such a provision aligns with current tort law.4 95
In addition, the requirement of proving willful misconduct as a
judicial means of escaping the liability limits of the Warsaw Con-
vention has influenced efforts on the part of aviation in*dustry
constituents to achieve increased levels of safety and security.4 96
Also, legal practitioners have noted the advantage which the
ICAO draft convention, a legal instrument, would have over con-
tractual agreements such as the IATA Intercarrier Agreement. 497
A new convention incorporating many of the provisions of the
492. See id. (reporting comment by John Westcott, director of underwriting at
London-based Hill Aerospace Syndicate, anticipating additional US$0.50 cost per air
ticket to accommodate air carriers' increased insurance premium costs).
493. See id. (reasoning that DOT would favor fifth jurisdiction of ICAO draft con-
vention).
494. See id. (reporting concerns of Robert Warren, general counsel for ATA, about
increased difficulty in collecting damages under provisions of ICAO draft convention).
495. See End of Liability Limits, supra note 425, at 3 (noting that ICAO draft conven-
tion requirement of proof of negligence for damage recoveries in excess of 100,000
SDRs favors international air passengers over domestic air passengers because provision
for strict liability up to the first 100,000 SDRs is benefit unavailable to domestic air
passengers).
496. See Goodbye to Liability, supra note 19, at 3 (describing effect of IATA Intercar-
rier Agreement elimination of fault system on aviation industry safety standards). The
requirement of proving negligence for second tier liability under the provisions of the
ICAO draft convention would prevent aviation industry safety experts from relaxing
such efforts in the future. Id.
497. See International Effort, supra note 27, (noting apprehension expressed by Lee
Kreindler, New York law firm partner, over legal uncertainty associated with IATA
Agreement due to its contractual nature). An air carrier who has paid damages to a
passenger under the provisions of the IATA Intercarrier Agreement may have difficulty
trying to subsequently recoup a contribution from a manufacturer because of the con-
tractual nature of the IATA Intercarrier Agreement. See Goodbye to Liability, supra note
19, at 3 (noting that Article 17 of Warsaw Convention providing for air carrier's liability
is legal in nature while air carrier's waiver of the liability limit under IATA Intercarrier
Agreement is contractual agreement). The manufacturer could dispute its liability for
contribution by arguing that the air carrier has no remedy against the manufacturer
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IATA Intercarrier Agreement would add the strength of interna-
tional law to an agreement achieved through the efforts of IATA,
an organization representing the majority of the world's air car-
498iers.
III. THE JATA INTERCARRIER AGREEMENT DOES
NOT ELIMINATE THE NEED TO AMEND THE
WARSAW CONVENTION
Despite its relative success in reforming the Warsaw Conven-
tion's liability limits, the IATA Intercarrier Agreement has failed
to reach the goal of uniformity to which the drafters of the War-
saw Convention aspired in 1929. 9 The chief disadvantage of
the IATA Intercarrier Agreement is its contractual nature. It is
far easier for a signatory air carrier to opt out of a contractual
agreement than to avoid the legal consequences of a convention
ratified by the majority of the world's governments. By contrast,
the main advantage of the ICAO draft convention is the force of
international law that it has as a legal instrument. Global adop-
tion of the ICAO draft convention presents the best means of
regulating future air carrier liability because the ICAO draft con-
vention would attain the dual goals of uniform liability limits and
systematic legal procedures to which the Warsaw Convention's
drafters originally aspired.,
A. Neither the IATA Intercarrier Agreement, the DOT Proposal, nor
the EC Prposal Achieve the Uniformity Envisioned by the
Drafters of the Warsaw Convention
The IATA Intercarrier Agreement does not fulfill the War-
saw Convention's dual goals of uniform liability limits and stan-
dardized procedures for resolving legal claims arising from inter-
national air travel.500 Although many air carriers have signed
the IATA Intercarrier Agreement, fewer air carriers have signed
the IATA Implementation Agreement.501  Furthermore,
because the air carrier paid the passenger voluntarily, rather than by virtue of the law.
Id.
498. See International Effort, supra note 27 (explaining legal advantage of ICAO
draft convention over IATA Intercarrier Agreement).
499. See supra notes 37-43 and accompanying text (explaining goals of Warsaw
Convention's drafters).
500. Id.
501. See supra note 381 and accompanying text (reporting that every air carrier
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although the IATA Implementation Agreement gives signatory
air carriers the option of agreeing that the law of a passenger's
domicile may determine how to calculate damages,50 2 the ATA
Implementation Agreement makes that provision mandatory for
its signatory air carriers.5 3 As a result of such confusing and
conflicting provisions, the IATA Intercarrier Agreement and the
two implementation agreements associated with it have added to
the already existing uncertainty related to air carrier liability in
international aviation accidents.
The DOT Proposal makes the possibility of establishing
standardized legal procedures for the international aviation in-
dustry even more remote. The DOT Proposal contemplates
compelling a signatory air carrier transporting passengers to or
from the United States to assume liability for any portion of a
passenger's trip that is flown on aircraft belonging to a successive
non-signatory air carrier.5 0 4 Consequently, current non-signa-
tory air carriers to the IATA Intercarrier Agreement are less
likely to become future signatories as a means of avoiding the
risk of assuming liability for the actions of other non-signatory
air carriers. In this manner the DOT Proposal reduces the likeli-
hood of achieving further consensus regarding increased liabil-
ity limits within the international aviation industry.505
The EC Proposal also does not achieve the Warsaw Conven-
tion's goals of uniform liability limits and systematic legal proce-
dures. Although the EC Proposal provides that the law of the
passenger's domicile may determine the calculation of dam-
ages, °6 such a provision could not achieve worldwide uniformity
because the EC Proposal would only be compulsory for EC mem-
who has currently signed IATA Intercarrier Agreement has not yet implemented its
provisions).
502. See supra note 373 and accompanying text (describing provisions of IATA Im-
plementation Agreement).
503. See supra note 377 and accompanying text (noting mandatory provision of
ATA Implementation Agreement requiring signatory air carriers to agree that passen-
ger may choose to have law of passenger's domicile determine amount of compensatory
damages).
504. See supra note 409 and accompanying text (setting forth DOT provision re-
garding liability of interline air carriers)
505. See supra notes 417-20 and accompanying text (explaining aviation trade as-
sociations' hopes of influencing non-signatory air carriers to implement IATA Intercar-
rier Agreement).
506. See supra note 465 and accompanying text (noting provision of EC Proposal
allowing passenger to file claim against air carrier in court of passenger's domicile).
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ber state air carriers.5 7 Similarly, the EC Proposal's require-
ment that air carriers disburse nonrefundable advance payments
to injured passengers or their survivors 0 8 would also apply only
to EC member state air carriers.50 9 Furthermore, this advance
payment requirement would create an added judicial burden.
The possible difficulty involved in proving to whom an air carrier
might owe such a payment and in quantifying immediate eco-
nomic need makes such a provision an invitation for increased
litigation.
B. Contractual Agreements Such as the IATA Intercarrier Agreement
Cannot Successfully Alleviate Passenger Confusion
Regarding Liability Limits
Contractual agreements such as the IATA Intercarrier
Agreement, the Montreal Interim Agreement,5 10 and the Japa-
nese Initiative51 1 make it easier for air carriers to opt out of such
arrangements than would be possible if such contracts were legal
instruments backed by the authority of the world's governments.
Due to its contractual nature, the IATA Intercarrier Agreement
only applies to signatory air carriers.51 Furthermore, without an
amendment to the Warsaw Convention, some courts may not
necessarily uphold certain provisions of such contractual agree-
ments as the IATA Intercarrier Agreement and the DOT Propo-
sal where such provisions contravene the articles of the Warsaw
Convention. 513
507. See supra note 466 and accompanying text (describing limited authority of EC
Proposal).
508. See supra notes 463-64 and accompanying text (describing nonrefundable ad-
vance payment provision of EC Proposal).
509. See supra notes 466-67 and accompanying text (explaining limited authority of
of EC Proposal).
510. See supra notes 97-125 and accompanying text (describing Montreal Interim
Agreement).
511. See supra notes 154-68 and accompanying text (describing Japanese Initia-
tive).
512. See supra notes 497-98 and accompanying text (describing concerns of legal
practitioners about contractual nature of IATA Intercarrier Agreement).
513. See supra notes 413-16 and accompanying text (discussing IATA concerns re-
garding future judicial support for provisions of DOT Proposal which contravene arti-
cles of Warsaw Convention).
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C. The ICAO Draft Convention Presents the Best Hope for Achieving
the Goals of the Warsaw Convention's Drafters
An international convention adopted by the majority of the
world's governments would be a more effective means of inform-
ing passengers of the risks involved in international aviation than
the fragmentation created by the best intentions of individual
trade associations like IATA. The average passenger now has too
much difficulty discovering whether the air carrier on whose air-
craft he has chosen to fly is a signatory to one of the agreements
implementing the IATA Intercarrier Agreement. On a given
flight, two passengers sitting side by side may have very different
liability limit coverage if both passengers failed to purchase their
tickets from air carriers who are signatories to the IATA Intercar-
rier Agreement.
As compared to a contractual agreement, a new convention
would have a more far-reaching effect due to the force of inter-
national law behind it.514 The IATA Intercarrier Agreement
eliminates the need to prove willful misconduct on the part of
an air carrier in order to circumvent the Warsaw Convention's
liability limits.515 As a result, the aviation industry risks losing a
strong incentive to continually seek higher safety standards.516
By contrast, the ICAO draft convention's second-tier liability
provision continues to place the burden of proof upon a passen-
ger to prove negligence on the part of an air carrier. 517 At the
same time as this is a lesser burden of proof than is willful mis-
conduct, it is likely to prove to be a sufficient incentive for air
carriers to continue to seek future security improvements for
their industry.518
514. See supra notes 497-98 and accompanying text (noting concerns of legal prac-
titioners about contractual nature of IATA Intercarrier Agreement).
515. See supra notes 370-73 and accompanying text (setting forth provisions of
IATA Implementation Agreement).
516. See supra note 496 and accompanying text (discussing influence of require-
ment of proving willful misconduct under Warsaw Convention had on aviation industry
safety standards).
517. See supra notes 489-90 and accompanying text (describing two-tier liability sys-
tem of ICAO draft convention).
518. See supra note 496 and accompanying text (explaining influence of require-
ment of proving willful misconduct under Warsaw Convention had on aviation industry
safety standards).
18371997]
1838 FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LAWJOURNTAL
CONCLUSION
Over sixty years of sincere efforts on the part of aviation
trade associations and various governmental authorities through-
out the world have not resolved widespread criticism of the War-
saw Convention's liability limits. In addition, various judicial at-
tempts at circumventing the Warsaw Convention's liability limits
have further compromised the dual goals of uniform liability
limits and systematic legal procedures which the Warsaw Con-
vention's drafters envisaged as a means of coping with the com-
plexities of international aviation. Although the IATA Intercar-
rier Agreement is one of the more commendable efforts at re-
forming the liability provisions of the Warsaw Convention to
emerge in recent years, a new international convention adopted
by the majority of the world's governments would clearly be a
better solution.
